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THE EUROPEAN UNION MIGRATION POLICY

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The monograph was prepared at the Department of World Economy and International Relations of Karaganda University of Kazpotrebsoyuz.

The monograph includes topics devoted to theoretical aspects and institutional foundations of migration policy of the European Union, reveals the issues of implementation of migration policy in the field of attracting foreign labor force and their integration into local communities of the EU countries, the policy on refugees and illegal migrants, as well as problems and prospects for the development of a unified migration policy of the EU. The presented monograph does not claim to exhaustively cover all the issues that may be related to the migration policy of the European Union.

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CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) countries have long been an integral part of global migration processes, traditionally acting as recipient countries of foreign labor from developing countries. At the same time, they attract other categories of migrants wishing to obtain citizenship of the EU countries and make every effort and opportunity to integrate them into the European community. In addition, EU countries have to accept a huge number of refugees seeking asylum in developed countries.

The EU migration policy has become a highly contentious issue in international and European politics with different interpretations, perceptions and narratives. The main interests defended by the EU are to regulate the number of irregular migrant arrivals and to focus on the admission of highly skilled migrant workers on a short-term basis.

The EU is currently experiencing tensions within the institutional mechanism due to conflicts of interest at the supranational and intergovernmental levels. These contradictions became clearly manifested during the migration crisis, which the EU countries faced in 2015 and which continues to play the role of a disintegrating and destabilizing factor.

For the EU countries, the migration issue is particularly relevant due to the fact that since the middle of the 20th century, the successful economic development of European countries has been inextricably linked to migration flows, which today would mean the rejection of such development. On the other hand, effective management of migration flows is of paramount importance for the EU countries in the context of ensuring public security and curbing modern threats in the form of growing international terrorism and extremism. The migration dilemma is the subject of heated discussions both in the scientific and socio-political environment.

The relevance of studying EU migration policy is due to the fact that EU countries (especially the founding members of the European Community) have considerable experience in implementing migration policy at the national level and form a pan-European migration policy. This draws special attention and is of significant interest to the member states of other regional integration associations, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), of which Kazakhstan is a member.

Kazakhstan is currently experiencing the so-called "migration transition" within the Eurasian migration system, gradually transforming from a donor country into a recipient country of foreign labor force, while

at the same time facing the problem of illegal migration. Against this background, the implementation of the positive experience of the EU is a priority for Kazakhstan, which in the changing conditions is facing the task of developing an effective state migration policy adequate to modern requirements, providing legislative and administrative means of its implementation. In such conditions, the study of the essence and peculiarities of the EU migration policy, the analysis of theoretical achievements in the relevant field has both scientific and practical significance, is an important prerequisite for a well-founded approach to improving the state policy in the field of migration.

Thus, the study of the institutional structure, mechanisms and tools of the EU migration policy, as well as its implementation in the crisis period is a prerequisite for both identifying successful practices and identifying contradictions and internal disagreements within the EU in order to form an effective migration policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the EAEU.

The theoretical and methodological basis for the study of EU migration policy was formed by the works of foreign researchers, as well as theories and concepts in the field of these issues. The works of such authors as T. Man, A. Montchretien, J.B. Colbert, A. Smith, D. Ricardo, J. Keynes, M. Friedman, P. Samuelson, M. Todaro, J. Harris, M. Pajore, A. Portes, D. Bell, and J. Borjas address the topic of the impact of migration processes on the economic system. A significant contribution to the study of migration processes was made by Western researchers - R. Park, E. Burgess, F. Martin, J. Taylor, L. Wirth, R. Mackenzie, W. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, S. Stoffer, D. Zipf and others. In the formation of modern scientific theories and concepts on international migration a significant role belongs to the views of authoritative foreign scientists: E. Lee, D. Massey, D. Coleman, W. Segal, R. Eppleyard.

The need for an interdisciplinary study of EU migration policy is due to the nature of international migration, which requires a comprehensive study of the interrelationships, regularities and impact of international migration on the socio-economic development and security of the host country, as well as the strategic soundness of the EU.

To comprehend the phenomenon of "international migration" and "EU migration policy" various methods were used, including general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, method of comparative analysis, chronological, statistical and graphical methods.

The study of legal and regulatory documents aimed at regulating international migration in the EU is of great importance. Statistical data, newsletters and reports of the Eurostat agency and the International

Organization for Migration (IOM) available on their official websites were also used.

This study was carried out within the framework of the implementation of the educational module of the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet program "The European Union Migration Policy" / EUMP - "The European Union Migration Policy". Project number 101085024-EUMP-ERASMUS-JMO-2022-HEI-TCH-RSCH and is aimed at complementing existing works on migration issues and deepening the understanding of the essence of the EU migration policy. The material contained in the monograph reflects the views of the authors.

Chapter 1. THEORETICAL FEATURES OF MIGRATION POLICY

1.1. **Theoretical foundations for the study of international migration**
1.2. **Concept, mains and objectives of migration policy**
1.3. **Main migration policy models**
1.4. **Organizational and legal mechanisms for managing migration flows**
1.5. **The concept of multiculturalism as a basis for the EU migration policy in the 21st century**

1.1. Theoretical foundations for the study of international migration

An important first step in seeking to achieve a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of migration is to connect theories of migration with general social scientific theories. This reflects the need to conceptualize migration as an integral part of broader processes of economic, political, cultural, technological and demographic change embodied in concepts such as social transformation, "development" and globalization. This is in contrast to more traditional scientific views that portray migration as either a response to developmental imbalances or as a function of static "push" and "pull" factors, as well as political views that portray migration as either a "problem that is not a problem" or a "problem that is not a problem that is not a problem". However, migration is a social process that cannot be seen in isolation from the broader processes of change of which it is a part.

Theoretical aspects of international migration have been studied by scholars and researchers since the 19th century. One of the first works on migration were the works of E. Ravenstein [1], who for the first time formulated a scientific definition of "migration" as a permanent or temporary change of residence [1, p.168]. E. Ravenstein in his "Laws of Migration" gave basic characteristics of migration processes, which

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[1]Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1834-1913) was a German-born British cartographer, geographer, and statistician. In 1880 he created the theory of population migration, which formed the basis of modern migration theory.

served as a starting point for subsequent research in the field of migration. Subsequently, many authors worked on the development of the conceptual apparatus, elaboration of criteria for the classification of international migration and the main scientific approaches to the study of the latter.

The main socio-economic and political factors of the impact of international migration on the EU development, as well as migration trends largely confirm the theoretical provisions put forward by authoritative foreign scholars of the XX century.

In the history of migration studies, there are various approaches to the phenomenon of migration itself and its impact on the economy. Among them the most applicable is the economic approach - a comprehensive approach to the study of population migration, which combines many theories, among which we can highlight the labour market theory of M. Friedman and P. Samuelson[1], the human capital theory of M. Todaro and J. Harris[2], the dual labour market theory of M. Pajore[3] and A. Portes[4]. All of them in their own way explain international labour migration or migration behaviour from an economic point of view.

At the same time, the economic approach in the study of international migration does not explain the influence of non-economic factors (political, psychological, ethno-religious and other societal[5] factors) on international migration and migration behaviour. In this context, the theories within the sociological and political science approaches are noteworthy.

The sociological approach to the study of international migration is represented by the theoretical positions of Everett S. Lee and Douglas Massey. Thus, according to the american sociologist E.S. Lee, who put forward the theory of "attraction-push", migration is a balance of pull and push factors at the point of departure and the point of arrival, built under the influence of intervening circumstances, or obstacles [2]. Another american sociologist D. Massey in his theory of "migration networks" substantiated the influence of such networks on migration motivation. He considers migration networks as established ties in the countries of

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[1] Molho I. Theories of Migration – a Review / Ian Molho // Scottish Journal of Political Economy. – 1986. – № 33. – P. 396-419

[2] Harris J.R., Todaro M.P. Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-sector Analysis // American Economic Review.1970. No.60. P.126-142

[3] Piore M. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies. – London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979. – 217 p.

[4] Portes A. Immigration Theory for a New Century : Some Problems and Opportunities // International Migration Review. Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans [Ed. by J. DeWind, C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz]. – Center for Migration Studies. – Vol. 31. – № 4. – 1997. – P. 799-825.

[5] a term used in sociology to denote relations and processes in the most complex social systems with developed governance, social class structures and institutions; societal - referring to society considered as a whole.

departure and entry on the basis of kinship, acquaintance and compatriotism. Migration networks, as social capital, are the third migration resource, along with material and human capital, which provides additional opportunities for migration [3].

The political science approach to understanding international migration is presented by a number of foreign scholars. Thus, K. Brettell[1] and J. Hollifield[2] studied the impact of migrants on the socio-political structure of the state and the identity of citizens, domestic relations, human potential that determines the role of the state in the political arena [4]. They were the first to scientifically analyse the migration policy of the state. A. Portes[3] and R. Rumbaugh[4] dwelled on the study of national security problems under the influence of uncontrolled, illegal migration flows [5], [6]. Migrants and their communities are political actors who take part in political life.

There is also a globalisation approach to the study of international migration. According to Wallerstein[5], the world system is divided into a centre (developed countries) and a periphery (developing countries). Globalisation creates links between the periphery and the centre, where migrant flows are directed. The centre creates demand for unskilled migrants. The periphery forms a mobile population that is inclined to emigrate. I. Wallerstein argues that international migration is characteristic of former metropolises and their colonies [7, p.39].

Saskia Sassen [6] explains international migration in terms of intensification of integration processes. In her opinion, international organisations play an important role in shaping migration flows, and foreign investments in developing countries contribute to increased emigration [8].

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[1] Zoe Caroline Brettel is a Canadian cultural anthropologist known for her research on migration and gender.
[2] James F. Hollifield is an American political scientist, professor of international political economy, who has worked as a consultant on migration issues for the US government, as well as for the UN, the World Bank, the OECD and other international organisations.
[3] Alejandro Portes is a Cuban-American sociologist. His academic research has focused on immigration to the United States and the factors that influence the fates of immigrants and their children.
[4] Ruben J. Rumbaugh is a noted Cuban-American sociologist and a leading expert on immigration and refugee resettlement in the United States.
[5] Immanuel Wallerstein - American sociologist, political scientist and neo-Marxist philosopher, one of the founders of world-system theory, one of the leading representatives of modern leftist social thought.
Wallerstein's world-system theory explains international migration as a result of the expansion of world capitalism, which is the centre of all world processes.
[6] Saskia Sassen is an American sociological economist known for her research on globalisation, international migration and urbanism. She is the author of the terms "global city" and "centralities", the concepts of "denationalisation" and "transnationalisation".

Today there is no unanimity in the definition of the concepts of "migration" and "labour migration". In scientific literature, the general concept of "population migration" is often understood as population mobility. Population migration is considered as a natural manifestation of mobility, which is motivated by the desire to improve living conditions, to satisfy needs [9, p.38]. In our opinion, this interpretation is too vague, it makes migration synonymous with social mobility in general. This approach mixes different social processes. Migration is also understood as territorial mobility as "some form of horizontal (or spatial) mobility" [10, p.121]. However, mobility implies potential ability and readiness to act, while migration is an action or process that has already been done or is being done. Therefore, the terms "migration" and "mobility" should be clearly distinguished here.

The most acceptable is the definition by L.L. Rybakovsky[1], which reflects the modern understanding of the phenomenon of "migration" as a territorial movement that occurs regardless of purposefulness, regularity and duration" [11, p.21]. The definition by E.Y. Sadovskaya[2] deserves attention, who considers migration as the movement of population across state borders, linking such movement with the change of residence [12, p.20].

According to A. Sovi[3], population migration is a demographic process that directly affects population reproduction through changes in reproductive behaviour, its age-sex structure and other changes in demographic development [13, p.213]. This theoretical position is very relevant, given the large migration flows and corresponding ethno-demographic structural changes in the EU countries.

The definitions known to us allow us to highlight the essential features of migration:
1) spatial (territorial) movement;
2) territorial redistribution of population;
3) permanent or temporary change of place of residence.

At the same time, there are several forms and types of international migration. Various flows of international migration can be characterised by applying two main criteria to them - duration and causality of migration (Table 1).

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[1] Rybakovsky L.L. - Soviet and Russian demographer, sociological economist.
[2] Sadovskaya E.Y. - kazakhstani scientist, IOM expert in Central Asia and Russia.
[3] Alfred Sauvy (1898-1990) - French demographer, anthropologist, sociologist, historian, economist and international public figure. He is the author of the concept of "third world", which first appeared in L'Observateur magazine in 1952, where he compared third world countries to the third estate in traditional society.

Table 1 – Classification of types and forms of international migration

	Types and forms	Characteristics of types and forms of international migration
Time factor	**irrevocable migration**	relocation from one country to another, often associated with a change of citizenship (emigration, immigration, marriage migration);
	permanent or long-term migration	migration for a long period, defined differently by migration acts in each country: the UN classification defines this period as 1 year; As a rule, it is of a labor or educational nature;
	short-term migration	departure (entry) to another country for a period of up to 1 year (according to the UN classification) or another period determined by national legislation for the purpose of employment or other economic activity, is carried out on the basis of seasonal, pendulum and episodic migration;
	seasonal migration	temporary departure (entry) of labor migrants for seasonal (agricultural, construction, etc.) work;
	pendulum migration	temporary labor migration associated with daily, weekly movement across the border to the place of work and return to the country of residence (border workers - frontiers). According to the UN recommendation, international migration statistics are not taken into account;
Causality factor	**episodic migration**	temporary travel to another country for business, recreational or tourist purposes. Includes trips for recreation, treatment, to participate in sports competitions, religious pilgrimage, as well as various types of business trips and commercial trips;
	forced migration	migration that is forced due to threats to the lives of migrants as a result of natural disasters, military operations, and persecution for political reasons. Has a temporary and permanent nature (refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers);
	voluntary migration	migration, the decision about which is made voluntarily; It is based on economic, psychological, family and other motives. May be temporary or permanent; often carried out on the basis of economic, labor or legal migration.
	economic migration	voluntary, often return migration, based on economic considerations; includes permanent, seasonal, pendulum, "shuttle"; main forms – labor and illegal migration;
	labor migration	involves the migrant selling his labor power in the country of entry, while a change of residence is not required; characteristics of permanent and short-term migration, seasonal, pendulum migration;
	illegal migration	illegal form of migration associated with violation of the entry regime (fake documents, illegal entry) or violation of the stay regime (exceeding the permitted period of stay, illegal employment); the goal is illegal employment.
Note: compiled by the author based on source [14].		

Among other migration flows, it is also worth paying attention to forced migration, which includes refugees. Refugees are people who flee armed conflicts or persecution. The basis for recognizing such persons as refugees is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for various reasons and grounds (political, racial, religious, national, or other affiliation), as defined in the 1951 Convention[1], as well as in the 1967 Optional Protocol[2]. Migrants, as a rule, decide to move not because of direct threat or persecution, but mainly in order to improve their lives: find a job, get a better education, reunite with family. There is another concept that is applicable in our research - asylum seekers[3].

The blurring of the terms "refugees" and "migrants" diverts attention from the specific legal protections that refugees require, such as protection from refoulement and penalties for crossing borders without permission to seek safety. There is nothing illegal about seeking asylum – on the contrary, it is a universal human right. The lack of distinction between the concepts of "refugees" and "migrants" undermines social support for refugees and the institution of asylum. This is especially true in times of crisis, when a large number of refugees need social protection more than ever before [15].

In contrast, refugees migrate over shorter distances, their migration is localized in geographic proximity, in neighboring countries, although they then continue their movement to more prosperous countries, but not immediately. This is due to the fact that most refugees are socially vulnerable groups of people who suddenly left their homes, without sufficient resources to move to more developed countries far from their home, in the hope of returning to what they have in their homeland.

Moving to another country for refugees is very difficult both financially (since moving is very expensive) and psychologically, because they were not previously prepared for this, and only the current circumstances forced them to take this step. This explains why a relatively small part of the population, exposed to disasters or oppression, becomes a mobile group. There are significant costs of migration; in addition to all of the above, there are also geographical and language barriers, which together make up differences in migration flows.

The main reason for labor migration is differences in income between countries of origin and countries of destination. Rich recipient countries of foreign labor are ready to attract the young working population of developing countries, which, in turn, are experiencing

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[1] Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951 by resolution No. 429 (V) // https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/refugees.shtml
[2] Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of January 31, 1967 // https://www.un.org/ru/documents/treaty/OHCHR-1966
[3] Asylum seekers are people who claim to be refugees but have not yet been recognized as such.

demographic pressure and high unemployment. Therefore, labor donor countries with lower incomes are also interested in labor migration and even in the emigration of part of the population for permanent residence.

The main distinguishing feature of international migration is the state border, its crossing and corresponding state control over both movement across the border (in the country of departure and in the country of entry) and subsequent stay in the country of entry, especially in connection with employment [14, p.29].

Thus, international migration is interstate territorial movement for the purpose of changing place of residence and work, permanently or for a certain period.

To assess the role of international migration processes in the socio-economic development of a country, it is important to take into account that different countries can participate in these processes in different ways, acting as a recipient country (importer) or a donor country (exporter) of foreign labor strength.

Developed by international organizations represented by the United Nations (UN), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the classification suggests classifying a country as a donor country or a donor country. recipients of foreign labor force (FWF) should take into account the composition of the country's population and its economically active part, as well as the level of outflow and inflow of remittances from migrants (Table 2).

Table 2 – Criteria for classification as recipient and donor countries

№	Recipient country	Страна-донор
1.	At least 2% of the country's population are persons of foreign origin and there are at least 200 thousand people in the country who have foreign passports	At least 2% of the country's population is abroad and their number is at least 200 thousand people
2.	At least 1% of the country's economically active population (or 100 thousand) are persons of foreign origin	At least 1% of economically active citizens (or 100 thousand) are abroad
3.	The outflow of migrant remittances from a country exceeds 2% of GNP (if migrant statistics are kept on the basis of foreign origin) or 1% of GNP (if migrant statistics are kept on the basis of citizenship and the country has a significant number of non-citizen migrants)	The influx of remittances from migrants working abroad exceeds 1% of GNP
	Note: compiled by the author based on source [16]	

At the same time, the question arises: can the state manage, regulate or control? In order to answer this question, let us turn to the views of scientists dealing with this issue, as well as to those concepts, theories and approaches that regulate the relationship of government agencies to the migration process, migrants themselves, and determine the nature of migration policy. At the same time, we will determine that economic, sociological and political science approaches are the dominant interdisciplinarity in the study of migration in general.

Supporters of the theory of political realism speak about the independent nature of state activity in the implementation of migration policy [4]. According to this theory, the main subject of migration policy is the state, from whose position a political science approach to the study of migration policy can be substantiated.

The state is able to regulate the migration process and regulate the conditions for the entry and stay of immigrants on its territory, guided by its interests and the objectives of its own national security. Of course, the state has such powers. Another question is whether the state has the material and financial resources and capabilities to implement its functions, and whether government bodies have the appropriate competencies.

In contrast to theorists of political realism, representatives of the theory of globalization claim a reduction in the role of states in regulating the migration process. In their opinion, this is the result of the activities of supranational organizations and transnational corporations, against the background of which migration acquires global and transnational characteristics. In particular, Ukrainian researcher B. Yuskiv speaks about this in his work [17, p. 153]. The same point of view is shared by the American sociologist S. Sassen [8]. In her opinion, the state, when forming and implementing migration policy, is not able to fully influence migration movements, although it retains a number of powers in organizing its own migration policy. Some researchers believe that in the context of globalization, the state is, in principle, unable to control the movements of people.

Broad processes of social change shape migration through its social, economic, cultural, demographic and political consequences, and to some extent migration itself also influences these processes.

A major conceptual problem with traditional theoretical approaches to migration remains their inability to meaningfully conceptualize how individual migrants and groups of migrants are active within broader structural constraints.

1.2. Concept, aims and objectives of migration policy

Migration policy implemented by the state influences whether migration will be a positive and stabilizing condition or, conversely, will cause increased instability in society.

The state's migration policy can be represented as a system of necessary conditions and targeted measures to manage the migration mobility of the population [18, p. 50].

From the point of view of an interdisciplinary approach, migration policy is an integral system of political-legal, financial-economic, organizational and administrative measures of the state and non-governmental institutions to regulate and influence migration processes from the perspective of national priorities, as well as the nature and structure of migration flows [19, p.26].

If we talk about the meaning of migration policy in the narrow sense, it means state influence on the management of migration processes. In a broad sense, migration policy is a structural element of the state's social policy; it deals with labour and employment issues and demographic policy.

L.L. Rybakovsky believes that migration policy is a system of ideas and conceptually united means generally accepted at the level of power structures, with the help of which, first of all, the state, as well as other social institutions, adhering to certain principles, imply the realisation of the intended goals [11,p.36]. We believe that this interpretation is more relevant to the regulation of migration at the country level.

It seems that in the context of this study it is necessary to expand the explanation of the term "migration policy", stating it in the following formulation: Migration policy is a set of legal, organisational, ideological, economic and other measures implemented by international bodies and organisations, state and municipal authorities to develop and implement significant areas of regulation of migration processes through the use of power, or the implementation of the impact on the authorities in the interests of significant state and municipal authorities.

In the modern period, migration policy is considered by most researchers in a narrow sense, which implies measures aimed at changing the number, composition, direction of migrants' resettlement, impact on their integration - indicators directly related to demographic issues. Based on the multifaceted nature of the migration field, it is reasonable to believe that migration policy must be developed and implemented in a broad format.

Policy subjects (actors) are central authorities, regional authorities, local authorities responsible for the relevant range of issues.

The actors of migration policy are the president, parliament, government, as they have the power to approve normative legal acts, and the judiciary, as migrants appeal to them in case of conflicts.

The objects of migration policy are migrants and institutions that receive migrants.

Currently, different countries differ considerably in setting their objective when developing migration policies. Consequently, migration policies of countries may vary depending on these objectives.

The main objective of migration policy is to regulate migration flows, overcome the negative consequences of migration processes, create conditions for the realisation of migrants' rights and their integration into the national socio-economic and cultural environment.

An important feature of migration policy is that it refers to the components of both internal and external policies of the state, being an example of their interrelation. Consequently, migration policy should be viewed in two directions:

Figure 1 - Migration policy directions

– external migration policy, the main objective of which is to ensure national security and contribute to the growth of the country's economic potential;

– internal migration policy focused on ensuring freedom of movement of the population within the country, optimising employment and regional markets.

Migration policy is the institutional form of state migration management, while migration legislation is its legal form.

In order to develop effective migration policies, it is very important that competing theories developed within different paradigms be organised and structured, as the existing trends in economic science

cannot provide answers to many complex problems of national economic development.

The study of the peculiarities of socio-economic dynamics of a country and international migration processes presupposes the use of a certain methodology that would make it possible, on the one hand, to determine the peculiarities of structuring the national economy taking into account the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of international migration flows, on the other hand, to describe the specifics of the mechanisms of this construction, linking them to certain socio-economic and cultural-historical conditions.

The liberation of the established concepts from absolutisation of the role of individual structure-forming factors and the development of a more universal and dynamic approach implies the analysis of the distribution of their positions in socio-economic space-time as a result of a complex and multidimensional process of interaction between different determinants.

The development of migration policy should be based on the following principles [18, p.51]:

co-operation between state and local authorities, development of social partnership institutions

prohibition of any form of discrimination

taking into account the interests of the state, society and the individual

ensuring human and civil rights and freedoms

protection of the public labour market

freedom of access to data on migration processes and decisions taken in the sphere of implementation of state migration policy fulfilment of the norms of national and international law

taking into account the peculiarities of regional development

Figure 2 - Principles of Migration Policy

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Migration policy in many countries emphasises current tasks, operational management and short-term planning. It should be noted that migration policy objectives depend entirely on the current migration situation.

The main objectives of migration policy include:

1) protection of rights and interests;

2) development of the immigration control system;

3) respecting the interests of the state in the development and implementation of migration policy;

4) regulation of migration flows, taking into account socio-economic development and environmental conditions in the regions, national compatibility, the specific psychology of migrants and climatic features of the places of settlement;

5) creation of conditions for the reception and accommodation of migrants, stimulating their active participation in adapting to the existing socio-economic situation [18., p.51].

At the same time, the external environment is changing very rapidly, so operational measures to adapt to new conditions alone are not enough. In modern conditions, if the state wants to maximise the positive effects of migration, the organisation of strategic migration planning is a necessity.

Migration policy can be based on the following alternative strategies (Figure 3).

Figure 3 - Migration policy strategies

1. Expansion strategy. Migration policy can be oriented towards expansion, i.e. increasing the number of migration programmes and the scale of migration itself.

2. Stabilisation strategy. Migration policies will aim at gradually building up operational improvements while continuing to work in line with their objectives.

3. Reduction strategy. Migration policy activity will be aimed at reducing migration programmes, categories of migrants and, in general, the scale of migration. This type of strategy can be adopted as a temporary measure while addressing a specific set of problems.

4. Combined strategy. Migration policy can simultaneously, but partially, implement any two or even three of the above strategies. For example, in some regions, where the shortage of labour resources is most acute, a strategy of expansion may be chosen, and in other regions, where there is a natural population growth, a strategy of stabilisation may be chosen.

Migration policy in the context of globalisation can have significant differences in orientation and content. The following types of migration policy are distinguished:

- on the scale of management of migration processes and relations, migration policy can be - global, regional, interstate, national;

- in relation to political power: actors of migration policy who have political power and, within the framework of existing opportunities, directly implement migration policy; actors who do not have levers of political power and do not have authority that can influence political power (political parties that are not in power, non-governmental organisations and others).

The following types of migration policies can also be distinguished (Figure 4):

− reflexive - a response to the transformation of the migration situation;

− planned - policy based on the assessment of the current situation and the forecasted course of events;

− latent - latent migration policy in the absence of defined objectives and measures in the field of migration management;

− preventive - migration policy aimed at prevention;

− unformed migration policy, in other words, the absence of a policy is also a policy.

Figure 4 - Types of migration policy

With regard to immigration and emigration, the following types of migration policies can be distinguished:

Figure 5 - Types of migration policies

1) to immigration:

− integration policy, which provides for the formation of selective mechanisms and activities for the integration of immigrants into the host society;

− segregation policy – restriction of settlement areas for migrants, where the host country allows them;

− selection policy – strengthening the procedure for selecting the host country;

− policy of multiculturalism;

− policy of assimilation;

2) to emigration:

− preventive policy, which involves the cooperation of the country of immigrants' arrival with the country of their departure, international and non-state organisations;

− admission policy, which is based on the grouping of different categories of migrants and selective criteria, and through this the regulation of the immigration flow is realised;

− control policy, which includes the formation of effective regulation of immigration processes;

− integration policy aimed at creating conditions for the integration of legal immigrants already in the host society.

Thus, migration policy in the modern period is a complex set of tools to harmonise the national or regional labour market, its adaptation to the requirements and priorities of economic development of states. There is a significant number of measures aimed at regulating immigration and emigration. The choice of an instrument is conditioned by the solution of a certain type of problem.

1.3 Main migration policy models

As we know, migration policy is categorised into two main types:

− immigration policy - deals with the affairs of foreigners entering the country;

− emigration policy - establishes a set of rules for those leaving the country.

The term "migration" is often understood as immigration policy. It would seem that what goals can a state pursue by allowing immigrants into the country and providing them with comfortable living conditions? In fact, there are quite a lot of such goals.

1. From the economic point of view, the state may be interested in attracting highly qualified specialists, labour force, eminent people, large investors, etc.

2. In some countries it is the constant inflow of immigrants that increases the actual population. A set of rules for repatriation of population can be included in the same paragraph.

3. The humanitarian component plays not the least role in migration policy - some states accept refugees for humanitarian aid.

4. The government cares about its citizens - it allows them to marry foreigners. Therefore, it develops a system of rules by which the family could be reunited afterwards.

Immigration policy addresses a whole range of state objectives. For the country as a whole, it is very important to be able to build the right policy model on migration issues, because the consequences can be dire for the indigenous population and the international status of the state.

There are only four classical models of migration policy.

Figure 6 - Classical models of migration policy

Each of them has a main concept that conveys its essence. In order to make it as clear as possible, after the description of the concept, historical examples of its application in different countries will be given.

1.Total exclusion. This model is based on not allowing foreigners into the territory of the country at all. The experience of some countries that have decided on such a policy has shown that the model of total exclusion is a utopia and ineffective in the conditions of globalisation.

However, even today there are still countries that are considered closed to migrants. All of them make it so difficult for foreigners to enter (and some make it so difficult for citizens to leave the country) that it is very difficult to enter them even for tourism purposes. These include DPRK, Turkmenistan, Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan. In these countries migration policy is very strict, and even submitting a full set of documents and successfully passing all checks does not guarantee the right to enter (exit).

2. Segregation. The concept of this model is to let foreigners in temporarily on legal grounds, but to give immigrants neither citizenship, nor social benefits, nor the right to participate in the life of the country. This is characteristic of states that need labour but do not want to admit foreigners on a permanent basis. The prohibition of family reunification and clearly defined terms of stay play an important role here. The undoubted advantage of this model is the peaceful environment in society: since the immigrants will not have civil rights, the natives will not be concerned about their presence.

This model was used by the states that are part of Western Europe: Germany, Belgium, Switzerland. They invited people to work exclusively, without giving them any social security. The labour force was called " *Gastarbeiter* "[1].

If we consider the effectiveness of the model on the vivid example of Germany, it is necessary to look back to the 1960s. It was assumed that migrants would only come to work under a temporary contract and leave the country at the end of the contract. After 10 years, this model proved ineffective - employers began to complain that the constant change of foreign workers cost them money (they had to train new people again and again, so it was more profitable for them to have permanent workers). As a result, the government made concessions and started giving permanent workers a German residence permit. Obtaining such a paper gave immigrants a chance to establish themselves in the country. From that moment on, foreigners began to settle in Germany.

3 Assimilation. This model is based on granting migrants a residence permit and a full social package, but foreigners, in turn, must undergo a process of full integration. In brief, this means that the newcomer should differ little from the native citizen - that is, he or she should know the language and culture of the country well, as well as adhere to all state laws and rights.

Assimilation, as well as the segregation model, has a significant advantage - peace in society. However, foreigners who have obtained residence permits prefer to accumulate in certain places and create

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[1] From German literally: guest worker or "guest labourer" - a term referring to a foreigner or resident of another country working on a temporary basis

ethnic groups. Of course, these people do not show any desire to integrate, believing that they should preserve their roots even in a foreign land. As a result, assimilation policies lead to the emergence of criminal gangs, the formation of entire neighbourhoods in cities where certain ethnic groups live, etc. Often attempts to eliminate such groups are regarded as racism.

There is a subspecies of the assimilation model - the integration model. It is based on the principle of gradual adaptation of the newcomer, but the essence remains the same - complete subordination of the immigrant to the local culture. The assimilation model has even become known as the "French" model, as it was applied in France for a long time. To this day, the migration legislation of the country clearly states that France does not discriminate against immigrants in any way and gives them all rights on a par with native citizens (except for interference in political activities). After a long stay in France, it is even possible to obtain citizenship.

4. Pluralism. This model implies accepting immigrants into the country while allowing them to preserve their culture. Despite the fact that such a model of migration policy causes great resonance among the native population of the country, it is considered to be the most effective in the conditions of world globalisation. Here, newcomers enjoy all the rights of the native population and have to adopt only the basic cultural values.

Under the pluralist model, the government must decide what to do with the large number of foreign immigrants. There are two options:

The first is not to interfere in their lives: not to infringe on their culture, but also not to support them at the state level.

The second is to acknowledge multiculturalism at the national level and to change social behaviour and social structures in the country because of it.

Sweden, Australia and Canada are considered to be adherents of multiculturalism. The USA also grants all civil rights to immigrants, but does not make any changes in the social structure of the country for the sake of their comfort.

The strategy of pluralism implies not only acceptance of the newcomer himself, but also of his family. Children born to foreigners who have obtained citizenship also become citizens of the country. All this often causes resentment among the indigenous population.

As world history shows, sooner or later, with the high rate of globalisation, all countries will switch to a pluralistic immigration model. At the present stage, many countries of the world pursue such a migration policy.

The following typology is based on a country's position on who can be accepted as a new member of the nation and under what conditions:

1. Imperial model. This model is that the member states of the nation are presented as objects of a single authority, the ruler. Today there are no liberal states that belong to this model, except Great Britain, which until 1981, with the adoption of the National Act, was based on this principle. Representatives of this model are the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.

2. Ethnic model. It is based on common historical roots that determine national belonging, which is expressed in the same culture, language, and the creation of a single ethnic community. This model does not allow migrants to have a distinctive culture, ancestral roots among the members of the nation. Such a period existed in Germany. It consisted in the fact that foreigners were denied citizenship if one of their parents was not of German origin. Nevertheless, a number of immigrants were granted the status of German citizenship because they were descendants of German immigrants (Aussiedler)[1].

3. Republican model. Here status is considered in connection with belonging to a political society. Immigrants obtain citizenship if they accept and fulfil political attitudes. Citizenship is a prerequisite for integration into society. The French Republic belongs to this type, where with the adoption of the "law of the soil" every infant born in France could acquire citizenship of the country, significantly weakening the means of acquiring citizenship. This situation is based on the French government's belief that French culture has limitless possibilities to assimilate immigrants without hindrance. Assimilation implies a situation where it is not possible to identify the origin of foreigners, but such citizens must not identify themselves as ethno-national minorities. But the events of the previous years have demonstrated the imperfection of this model.

4. Multicultural model. It promotes the idea that cultural differences within communities are acceptable. Foreigners have a full-fledged place in the education system, are participants in the labour market, and have a voice in decision-making. The priority of this model is to achieve equality. In countries with this model, a policy is created aimed at the integration of foreigners, their families and children, which is implied as the achievement of equal access to the institutional system. For this purpose, conditions for institutionalisation of immigrant culture are created. Such a model demonstrates the policy of integration [20, p.11].

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[1] Aussiedler, meaning "displaced persons" in German; since 1993, Spätaussiedler, meaning "late migrants") are persons of German nationality who fall within the scope of the Displaced Persons and Refugees Act of 1953.

Various factors influence the development of migration policies in EU countries, including:

- Ethnic composition of the population and ethno-cultural characteristics;
- the current demographic situation;
- traditional ties with the countries of origin of migrants;
- the structure of migration flows;
- motives for migration;
- internal socio-economic problems, etc.

Despite attempts to build a unified migration policy, each state builds its migration policy in its own way. In this context, it is possible to distinguish several country models of migration policy, differing in the development of legislation and experience of migrants' integration into the European community.

The countries of the so-called "old core" (Western European countries such as Germany and France) have the greatest experience in dealing with migrants and refugees from developing countries. At the same time, there are differences in migration policies among the countries of the "old core".

Central and Northern European countries have mostly accepted refugees and their experience only began to emerge in the 1970s.

Eastern European countries, including the Baltics, which have relatively recently joined the EU, against the background of the first two groups have virtually no experience with migrants, especially Muslims.

EU member states regularly face huge migration flows and the problem of refugees. Due to the specifics of the political structure of the integration association, this problem is addressed at the supranational and national levels.

Thus, migration policy is understood as a state policy in the field of migration, which has a system of means, where in compliance with the established principles, it is supposed to achieve certain goals. This policy consists of a set of rules and measures aimed at regulating civil and social relations in the sphere of movement of individuals.

Each world power carefully develops a strategy of migration policy, trying to find the most favourable way out of the current situation. Some states simplify the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners, while others, on the contrary, do everything possible to avoid massive influxes of migrants. A common problem for many countries is the endless flow of illegal immigrants who try in every possible way to circumvent existing migration laws. In this direction, each country also takes measures that, in the opinion of the government, are the most effective.

1.4 Organisational and legal mechanisms for managing migration flows

Migration policy is a set of socio-political concepts and views on international migration, as well as specific organizational, legal and socio-financial measures aimed at regulating the migration process.

State policy in the field of migration flows at the global level is formed and implemented in declarations, conventions, and other acts that are adopted initially at the UN level, such organizations as: the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM). Decisions adopted at UN World Conferences carry significant weight and, together with adopted and ratified conventions, covenants, and protocols, form the general international legal framework for regulating and managing the migration process at the intergovernmental level. The migration policy of states is also based on conventions and other acts of the UN system, as well as regulations adopted at the regional level.

At the same time, legislative acts in the field of migration of a particular state have both common features and often fundamental differences, depending on a number of reasons: whether the state has joined international acts on migrant problems, problems of state security, the demographic situation in the state, on the state of labor markets, etc.

An assessment of international acts and national laws allows us to conclude that migration policy contains or permeates such generally accepted definitions as environmental social, national and international policies.

Migration research allows us to distinguish between approaches to the study of immigration control - at the international and national level.

At the international level, immigration policy is understood in the context of international relations. In this case, immigration control is interpreted as a structural necessity arising from the discrepancy between open and globally characterized market forces and closed, territorially limited state entities.

National-level assessments of migration policies attempt to examine how the influence of pressures is perceived within the boundaries of national political systems, as well as to identify the internal factors that create and determine specific immigration policies in Western countries.

To reveal the essence of the state immigration policy of Western European countries, let us evaluate the legal framework of migration regulation.

In **Belgium,** the legal framework for regulating migration consists of the Law on the Entry, Residence, Right of Settlement and Expulsion of Foreign Nationals; Royal Decree on the Entry, Residence, Right of Settlement and Expulsion of Foreign Nationals; and a Royal Decree establishing the procedures to be followed by permanent refugee appeals commissions. The State stipulates that applications for admission must be made upon arrival in the State at points of entry or within eight days of arrival; Late applications will not be considered. Refusals to accept late applications may be appealed to the State Council.

The decision to accept an application from a potential refugee is made by the Minister of Internal Affairs or his authorized representative; Responsibility for analyzing the validity of applications rests with the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, the head of an autonomous body that was under the Ministry of Justice and then under the Ministry of the Interior. In case of a negative decision, the applicant is obliged to leave the state within 5 days. Representatives of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees can conduct their own examination of these decisions on their own initiative or upon request [21, p. 34].

In **the Federal Republic of Germany,** a UNHCR representative is involved in all policy and legal work regarding resettled persons and has the right to be present during the examination of the case; foreigners arriving in search of asylum have the right to contact the UNHCR office. UNHCR participates in issues related to asylum practices by submitting formal applications to the relevant judicial authorities of the state. The total number of foreign citizens in Germany exceeds 11 million, only a small part of whom arrived uninvited. The official policy of Germany regarding migration flows is aimed at limiting the further influx of foreign citizens from "third countries", including assistance in voluntary repatriation and even reintegration of repatriates in their homeland.

State policy regarding migration flows is based on the principle that the Federal Republic of Germany is not an immigration state and should not become one in the future. The updated Foreign Citizens Act limits the influx of foreign citizens from third countries and facilitates the integration of foreign citizens in Germany, including simplifying the procedure for acquiring German citizenship. According to the Constitution, a German is not actually a German by blood, but every citizen of Germany. Citizenship can be granted to offspring [21, p.35].

Germany itself views German citizenship, a German passport, not as a "pass" to the state, but as a kind of "matura", a sign that integration has been successful. Refugees and asylum seekers are accepted in

Germany in numbers and to social standards that are unlikely to be found in the EU. Restrictive measures (stricter border controls, shorter processing times) have reduced the number of applicants, but have not weakened Germany's attractiveness for such people. Germany's share of immigrants to the EU is increasing. The presence of a significant number of foreign citizens in the country creates many difficulties and problems; there are cases of unfriendliness of some local residents towards them [21, p. 35]. Citizens' dissatisfaction is caused by a significant amount of social assistance to foreign citizens, which falls on the shoulders of German taxpayers, non-compliance with status obligations by foreign citizens (the right of political asylum is granted to a refugee due to the danger of his stay in Germany), at the same time, some of them spend vacation in their homeland) . The issue of German citizenship is becoming increasingly relevant and influencing the political situation: the Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats and Greens are in favor of allowing dual citizenship, while the Christian Democrats are strong opponents.

The *Greek* legal framework consists of the Law on Entry, Exit, Residence, Employment and Deportation of Foreign Nationals; Presidential Decree "On the procedure for verifying applications of foreign citizens for refugee recognition, refusal of recognition and cooperation with the UNHCR." Their execution is entrusted to the Police Department for Foreigners (under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Order). An application for asylum is submitted to the department, and decisions on applications are made by the ministry [21, p. 36].

Refugee and migrant issues in *Denmark* are dealt with under the Aliens Act and the Aliens Ordinance. Decisions on the validity of asylum applications are made by the Danish Office for Foreigners. Asylum applications are submitted to border police at entry points, who conduct a preliminary interview with applicants. An asylum seeker arriving from a safe country may be denied access to asylum proceedings. In practice, applicants with close ties to Denmark (i.e. spouses and minor children) are in a significant number of cases admitted to asylum procedures, even if they come from safe countries of first asylum. In case of refusal in the first instance procedure, the applicant can appeal the decision. The Law on Foreign Citizens provides for the provision of de facto status to persons whose applications for asylum are close in content to applications for refugee status or contain other global motives. In this case, the Minister of the Interior may grant a residence permit for humanitarian reasons [21, p.38].

Migration policy in **Spain** is based on the Asylum Law and the Royal Decree. In this state, the implementation of these actions is entrusted to the Joint Office of Refugees and Asylum. The Interdepartmental Commission on Asylum and Refugee Status deals with the problems of migrants. Significant measures have been taken to expedite the processing of both manifestly well-founded and manifestly unfounded or fraudulent applications. Unlike other States, Spanish law distinguishes between the recognition of refugee status under the International Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the granting of asylum. Recognition of refugee status for those who meet the criteria of the Convention is purely declarative, while the granting of asylum entails legal obligations for both parties. Under domestic law, asylum is defined as selective protection granted by a country in the exercise of its sovereignty.

Italian legislation in the field of migration consists of the Decree-Law, the Decree of the President of the Italian Republic. The procedure for applying for asylum involves submitting a written application to the Border Police immediately upon arrival in the state. [21, p.40] The applicant is then sent to the provincial police department, where the application is registered. Border and provincial police can either refuse the applicant or allow him or her to undergo the status determination process. Provincial police were required to transmit the asylum application to the Central Commission within seven days, which then made a decision within 15 days. The Commission's meetings were closed and applicants generally did not have the right to legal counsel. If the application was rejected, the applicant could appeal to the Regional Administrative Tribunal. The general principles of the Italian legal system also provide for the possibility of appealing to the Council of State of the Republic.

In Norway, the legislation contains the Aliens Act and Ordinance, the implementation of which is the responsibility of the Immigration Directorate of the Ministry of Justice. Asylum seekers who do not have close ties to Norway are not allowed to undergo this procedure if they come from the state of first asylum. Decisions on applications are made by the Department based on an interview with the police. If an asylum application is rejected at first instance, the applicant may appeal to the Ministry of Justice within three weeks. However, filing an appeal does not stop the asylum seeker from being deported from the state. The main point to emphasize is that national legislation protects persons who have left their states of residence for reasons similar to those for which this status is granted from returning to their states of origin - they are granted

humanitarian status. The Immigration Directorate will determine whether there are compelling humanitarian reasons for granting residence permits in cases where there are no grounds for granting refugee status under foreign nationals legislation. It should be noted that persons granted humanitarian status do not have the right to family reunification. Such a legal right only appears upon receipt of a permanent residence permit, i.e. after at least three years have passed from the date of receipt of a temporary residence permit. Practice shows that Norway is very strict regarding the admission of foreign citizens [21, p.41].

The political and legal framework for regulating forced migration in *Finland* includes the Aliens Act and Ordinance, as well as regulations concerning the functions of the Ministry of the Interior, the Aliens Defamation Commissioner and the Appeals Board (an independent semi-legal entity). Responsibility for the implementation of legislative acts rests with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Appeals Commission. All asylum seekers are interviewed by the police. Once a decision is made to deny asylum, a deportation order is issued. Finnish diplomatic missions in foreign countries can grant a residence permit in Finland for a limited period of time if there are global humanitarian or other special reasons [21, p.41].

French legislation contains the Decree on the conditions of entry and stay of foreign citizens, the Law on the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA). The last major reform of immigration law was a 1998 law introduced into the French National Assembly by Interior Minister J.P. Chevenman. The main government body on migration issues is the FPB (under the Ministry of External Relations), which is assisted by the Official Council (College), an inter-ministerial body of which a representative of UNHCR is a member. As part of the preliminary procedure, the OFPP is required to make a decision within eight days, which the applicant can appeal to the Court of Appeal within 48 hours by the applicant and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Applications of asylum seekers are automatically rejected if they do not comply with the Schengen Agreement [21, p.42]. The French Constitution guarantees the right of asylum to all third-country nationals who fear persecution in their home country. Refugee status is granted by a special non-governmental organization.

It should be emphasized that the national immigration legislation of Western states is not only based on international legal principles, but has also developed holistic principles in this area and is enshrined in such interstate acts as the *Schengen Agreement, Maastricht and Amsterdam*

Agreements [22]. The first major step towards European unity was obviously the Schengen Agreement between six European states, which came into force on March 26, 1995 [22]. It provides for its member states to abolish all border controls on each other's borders. In principle, no state party to the agreement is allowed to carry out permanent border surveillance at the borders with other member states.

Since the mid-1990s of the 20th century, control over migrant flows has been organized at the external border of the Schengen zone with countries outside it. The abolition of surveillance in this territory presupposes the unity of the Schengen countries, including the unity of action to prevent illegal immigration flows. However, the agreement provides that border controls within the Schengen area can be reintroduced in the event of a global threat to the national security of a member state. The signing of the Schengen Agreement predetermined a common visa policy. Schengen visas are issued to any member country, allowing non-European Union citizens to travel throughout the territory [22].

The parties to the agreement adopted uniform standards for border control at external borders. A unified automated system has been introduced – the Schengen Information System (SIS). Member countries are required to register in it the names of foreign citizens whose presence on their territory is undesirable. SIS can be contacted from any border control point. National border guards may refuse entry into the Schengen area to any foreigner whose name is listed in the SIS. Within the Schengen area, there is very simple police cooperation, including the exchange of information and the right to prosecute on the territory of another member state.

The Maastricht Agreement of 1992 played an important role in regulating migration, which established the principles of expanding cooperation between member states of the European Union in the field of immigration and security [21, p.42]. The Amsterdam Agreement of 1997 provides for the development of a common immigration policy, which is now within the competence of the European Financial Community [21, p.42]. However, this does not mean that national countries are completely deprived of this competence. According to the principle of subsidiarity, they can continue to apply national policies to common European laws.

When developing migration policy, each state proceeds, first of all, from its own national interests and socio-economic needs. If the analysis of the situation, carried out at the first stage of developing migration policy, indicates the need to attract additional human and labor resources, then the main activities of the state are aimed at encouraging immigration and developing programs for the integration and adaptation

of the foreign population into the host society. If the results of the analysis demonstrate stable, progressive socio-economic development, in which an increase in the immigration flow may be a threat to such development, the main emphasis is either on maintaining immigration at the existing level or on limiting it.

Since modern Europe has been in the midst of a steady demographic decline for a long time, which is manifested in a declining number of young people of active working age, an increase in the proportion of older people in the total population with a growing number of people from other countries and regions of the world, this situation forces the governments of European countries to solve problems reducing the population by admitting immigrants into the ranks of its citizens. In this case, the main goal of migration policy is the integration of immigrants into their host society.

1.5 The concept of multiculturalism as the basis of EU migration policy in the 21st century

Most states are distinguished by cultural and religious diversity, which is becoming increasingly heterogeneous due to population migration. In recent decades, global migration has reached a scale unprecedented in world history. The reasons for migration are varied and change over time. Ethnic conflicts and the forced displacement of people, the movement of the poor to wealthier societies, have led to significant changes in the countries receiving such people. It is in order to cope with the consequences of these changes that a policy has been developed in many developed democratic countries, collectively called "multiculturalism". The ideas of multiculturalism were formulated and developed in states with a liberal-democratic political system at the turn of the 60s-70s. XX century The main goal of multiculturalism was the formation of an integrated society, eliminating clashes and conflicts between the indigenous population and immigrants. Multiculturalism has replaced the "melting pot" policy used in the United States, which involved combining different cultures into one. Since the 80s. In the twentieth century, multiculturalism became official state policy in a number of European countries, the USA, Canada, etc. [23, p.39-40].

Multiculturalism is a complex and polysemantic concept that is often used to describe various political processes that occur differently in different societies, implying the coexistence of various cultural and ethnic groups that retain their own unique cultural traits and characteristics within one society/state [24, p.9]. An essential feature of multiculturalism,

which distinguishes it from other methods of managing ethnic groups, is the recognition of ethnic diversity and rejects the assimilation of immigrants [23, p.4].

In Europe, multiculturalism is considered at two levels: 1) in everyday life; 2) at the institutional level. In everyday life, multiculturalism has actually become an integral part of European society. However, it should be noted a number of reasons due to which differences arise in society in everyday life: 1) groups leading a closed lifestyle within the framework of their cultural traditions; 2) the unacceptability of Islamic identity. Most Europeans highlight the reasons for the multicultural split in religion, in particular in Islam [26, p.91].

There are also 2 models of multiculturalism: multiculturalism, which arose as a result of a large flow of immigrants to the countries of the European Union, and multiculturalism, based on the relationship between national minorities and indigenous people [27, p.4]. In addition, there are 3 main configurations of the integration policy of the European Union (Table 3).

Table 3 – Main configurations of EU integration policy

№	Name	Description
1	Political assimilation	Creating conditions to ensure the smooth acquisition of citizenship by immigrants. Possible special needs of immigrants are ignored and considered a private matter for the immigrant. This configuration assumes a direct connection between national identity and the acceptance of the political principles of the host country.
2	Functional Integration	Integration of immigrants exclusively into the economic and social spheres. Immigrants become full participants in the labor market, healthcare, education, etc., however, at the same time, immigrants are limited in political rights, including obtaining citizenship.
3	Multicultural integration	The emphasis is on recognizing the special rights of immigrants from other cultures and religions. The basis of this model is equal opportunity.
Note: compiled by the author based on the source [28, p.20-21]		

It should be noted that the configurations presented in Table 3 reflect the prevailing approaches in the European Union and are rarely used in their original form.

In a number of documents of the Council of Europe, member states of the European Union defined their intentions to form a multicultural civil society, where the main principles were the equality of all citizens, their loyal and equal attitude towards the state, intercultural coexistence, etc. However, political leaders of some European countries began to express criticism about the application of multiculturalism policies. One of the first to declare the failure of the policy of multiculturalism was Angela Merkel, speaking in Potsdam in 2010: "Germany's attempt to create a multicultural society has suffered a complete failure." The next to make such statements were the leaders of Great Britain and France [24, p.13].

In 2010, the best-selling book by Sarrazin T. "Germany Does Away with Itself" was published, which presented arguments accusing Muslim migrants of what they do not want or cannot integrate. Blaming Muslims for all integration problems. Moreover, Sarrazin attributed cultural and social differences mainly to genetic predisposition. According to Sarrazin, German society as a whole inevitably becomes less intellectual due to the higher birth rate among intellectually "inferior" Muslim migrants [29, p.173]. Criticism of the policy of multiculturalism can be traced in other European countries, for example, in Denmark and the Netherlands. The works of Dutch researchers say that "blaming multiculturalism for social problems has become a Dutch national sport" [27, p.4].

A common criticism of multiculturalism is that it has never been defined. Multiculturalism policies are developed at the level of the nation state, vary from state to state and depend on the social environment, political tradition, ethnic and linguistic diversity, etc. Another criticism of multiculturalism, according to European researchers, is that it considers all cultures as equal and thereby gives preference to traditions that are incompatible with the principles of liberal democracy [25, p.61]. In addition, the theory of multiculturalism excludes the idea of equality of opportunity, since benefits, privileges, and concessions to the "weak" (the so-called "positive discrimination") lead to the infringement of the "strong". Thus, a number of researchers believe that the theory of multiculturalism is intended to discriminate and infringe on the main culture [23, p.46].

Consequently, there are no uniform features of multiculturalism; however, researchers have identified several features:

1. Some states have never officially accepted multiculturalism: Germany, France, Greece, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Finland. In Italy, Finland, Germany and Ireland there is official bilingualism for some indigenous minorities, but not for immigrants.

2. States in which some powers have been transferred to local authorities on a cultural or linguistic basis: Spain, Switzerland and Belgium. The governments of these countries make some concessions to the political demands of local indigenous minorities, but do not make similar concessions to immigrants. Spain and Belgium faced serious problems of ethnic separatism based on language, which were resolved by devolution of powers to French and Flemish in Belgium and Catalan and Basque in Spain.

3. States in which multiculturalism is present to varying degrees at the national and local levels, but not as a stated national policy: Great Britain. British multiculturalism has political and cultural autonomy for Scotland, Wales and Wales and Northern Ireland, but not for migrants.

4. States with fully developed national policies regarding immigrants, population groups and indigenous populations: Sweden, Norway.

5. States that initially accepted and then rejected the policy of multiculturalism: the Netherlands. Special services for immigrants operate in large cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. All political parties in the Netherlands oppose further immigration.

The political situation in the country plays a big role in the adoption of multicultural policies. Typically, the liberal or social democratic side has a positive attitude towards multiculturalism, while conservatives consider themselves defenders of national and Christian values. However, there are some differences: trade unions, which are traditionally liberal, object to immigrant labor, and business representatives, who are conservative, support immigration when it can fill labor gaps and provide growth in the domestic market. It is much easier for those who oppose this policy to build a unified model of multiculturalism than for those who are for it [25, p.61-62].

According to a number of researchers and experts, attitudes towards Muslim migrants have worsened in Europe. Intolerance towards them began to manifest itself after terrorist attacks in the USA (2001), Madrid (2004), London (2005), etc. For most Europeans, these events raised concerns about the behavior of Islamists, fear and mistrust, hostility, and radical anti-Western sentiments spread among Muslims after the invasion of international coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Accordingly, one way or another, aggression towards Europeans began to grow among Muslims living in Europe. In a number of countries of the European Union, sociological surveys were conducted to understand the attitude of Europeans towards Muslims. Thus, according to a Pew Research Center (PRC) study conducted in 2006, 53% of Germans surveyed and more than 61% of Spaniards admitted to having a negative attitude towards Muslims. A 2008 study found that intolerance towards

Muslims was on the rise in England, France and Poland. Thus, in France – 38%, in England – 23%, and in Poland – 46% [24, p.15-16].

The financial crisis of 2008 further exacerbated social divisions between different ethnic groups. The elections to the European Parliament in 2014 and the rise to power of far-right forces led to the replacement of multiculturalism with monoculturalism [23, p.45]. Not only the right, but also supporters of liberal views began to speak out against immigrants. The main point of protests against Muslim immigrants is to protect German culture from the Islamic threat. Part of the European population believes that Muslim migrants are not able to accept European secular identity and European freedom, but on the contrary, they strive to destroy European foundations [23, p.92]. The case of the blasphemous cartoons became one of the most striking examples of the dialectic between European freedom and another culture. That Islam is a significant minority religion in almost all European countries is a reality today. Researcher M. Mazari notes that if "we want to avoid the threat of extremism, then it is necessary to include marginal Muslim communities in the mainstream of life, especially young people" [26, p.100].

The policy of multiculturalism for the countries of the European Union became an agreement between immigrants, who were given the opportunity to preserve their language and culture, and EU governments, who received cheap labor. For example, in Germany, multiculturalism provoked the separation of migrants, since the need for integration into German culture disappeared. Immigrants viewed Germany as a country where favorable living conditions were created, while identifying themselves only with their homeland [23, p.47]. However, according to a 2019 Pew Research Center (PRC) survey, in some European countries immigrants are becoming less likely to speak their native language. In 14 countries of the European Union, 8 out of 10 adults speak the language of the country of residence, for example, in Poland - 100%, in Greece - 98%, in Hungary - 97%, in France - 97%, in Italy - 96%. In other EU countries, the proportion of adults who speak their native language is smaller: in Germany – 90%, in Slovakia – 89%, in Spain – 81%, in Bulgaria – 80% [30].

Today, ideological differences remain in the European Union regarding views on traditions, national pride, discrimination, etc. Issues of culture and identity regularly become the center of heated political debates. Thus, according to a study by the Pew Research Center (PRC), views on issues of national identity in France and Germany have become less restrictive and more inclusive. Compared to 2016, when immigration and diversity became a major issue, fewer people support the view that to be French, German or British, a person must be born in that country, be a Christian, follow national traditions and customs, speak

the language of the host country. All these issues give rise to ideological differences and disputes. Natives also tend to believe that immigrants are willing to adopt the customs and lifestyle of the host country. For example, this opinion is held by 51% of the public in Germany, compared to 33% in 2018. Thus, the survey showed that every year the number of people who think that their countries will develop faster and become better if they are open increases for change [31].

However, the problem of multiculturalism cannot be considered only as the relationship between Europeans and immigrants, but as noted above, it is necessary to consider multiculturalism based on the relationship between national minorities and indigenous people. In a number of European countries (Spain, Northern Ireland) there are conflicts and clashes between ethnic and religious groups living within the same country for several centuries. Interethnic and interreligious conflicts escalate every time separatist sentiments intensify. However, it should be noted here that groups seeking autonomy live separately, although they live territorially within the same state. Immigrants work together with the indigenous population. Even when creating separate neighborhoods, they meet with the indigenous population in various institutions, shops, transport, etc. [24, p.17].

Thus, the European Union was not prepared for the influx of immigrants. The migration policy of the European Union did not have a single approach and was not unified. The policy of multiculturalism, which aimed to integrate all ethnic groups, only worsened the relationship between the indigenous population and immigrants.

Chapter 2. EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS 2015–2016

2.1. Geopolitical aspects of the development of the migration crisis in Europe
2.2. Features of the EU migration crisis in 2015
2.3. Problems of resolving the migration crisis in the EU

2.1. Geopolitical aspects of the development of the migration crisis in Europe

The middle of the second decade of the 21st century was marked by global geopolitical shifts, caused by the crisis and instability of the development of the political situation, no longer in individual countries, but in a number of states and regions of the planet. At least three of the six continents are currently affected by global crises.

The migration crisis in Europe, caused by the mass migration of refugees and migrants from armed conflict zones, states and territories affected by the escalation of violence, as well as unfavorable living conditions in their places of former residence, should rightfully be classified as one of the most significant crises of our time.

According to European analysts, the situation with illegal migrants currently in the EU countries is the most acute crisis with displaced persons since the Second World War.

The migration crisis that began in the countries of the European Union in April 2015, due to the uncontrolled flow of refugees and migrants from armed conflict zones in the Middle East region, as well as a number of African and Asian states with unfavorable socio-economic conditions, had an extremely negative impact on the internal political situation and development prospects for both individual EU member states and the European Community as a whole.

The migration crisis is understood as the state of the migration system that arises as a result of a large-scale territorial and short-term departure of a large number of residents from the regions of formation of migration flows, their movement and placement within the transit region and subsequent arrival in the regions of accumulation of migration flows [1]. In this case, the research hypothesis is as follows: during a crisis, compared to non-crisis periods, there is a decrease in the degree of

diversification of migration flows between the constituent units of the MS, which leads to a change in its spatial structure.

The trigger for the European migration crisis, one of the most significant in terms of its political and socio-economic consequences since the Second World War, was the consequences of the Arab Spring.

The flow of immigrants to EU countries increased significantly in 2011–2015. This was primarily due to the outbreak of the "Arab Spring" and, as a consequence, to the aggravation of socio-economic problems, a decline in living standards, external interference, armed conflicts and the intensification of terrorist groups in a number of countries of the Arab-Muslim world. A particularly sharp increase in the migration flow took place in 2013–2015.

Countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya supply the main refugees (legal and illegal) to the EU. A significant proportion are from African countries (Sudan, South Sudan, Congo, Somalia, Mauritania, Tunisia, Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon). According to UNICEF, more than 4 million people have left Syria alone, where the armed internal conflict has been ongoing for five years, and more than 2.6 million have left Afghanistan, which has the second largest number of refugees [2]. About 1 million people have fled Somalia due to conflict and famine. A large flow of refugees also comes from Sudan and South Sudan, where internal conflict has been ongoing since December 2013.

The peak of the migration load occurred in 2015 and 2016, when European countries accepted 2.5 million refugees [3]. A key role in the formation of the migration crisis was played by the sharp increase in the number of refugees from Syria and Iraq, which accounted for a share of the total number of refugees in the EU for the period from 2015 to 2019. accounted for more than 87% of all internally displaced persons from Arab Asian countries to the EU [3].

In 2015, Eurostat reported that more than 1.2 million refugees applied for asylum in the EU. The number of refugees from Syria has doubled compared to 2014 and reached 360 thousand people. The number of refugees from Afghanistan increased 4 times and amounted to 178 thousand, and from Iraq - 7 times (in 2015 there were already 121 thousand people) [4]. At the same time, the number of refugees who will be forced to leave the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in the near future may increase. According to the UN, more than 55 thousand refugees arrived in the EU in January 2016. Moreover, the number of arrivals to Europe via Greece in January 2016 increased 35 times compared to the figures for January 2015 [4].

The largest number of refugees is concentrated in Germany, France, Italy and Spain (each of them has 1-1.5 million people). In the period from January to June 2015, Germany, France and Sweden led in

the number of accepted migrants. Germany bears the main burden. According to the German Ministry of Internal Affairs, as of the end of 2015, more than 800 thousand applicants for refugee status arrived in Germany.

Given the influx of refugees, the EU is experiencing serious difficulties with their integration into society. Moreover, the unpreparedness of the European border control system to accept such a large number of refugees, the lack of identification documents for some of them, as well as the inability to certify the authenticity of such documents, led to the fact that, according to the German Ministry of Internal Affairs, tens of thousands of refugees entered Germany, without undergoing proper registration and control. At the same time, some of the registered refugees did not arrive in the places where they were sent by the authorities, and their whereabouts are unknown.

2.2. Peculiarities of the EU migration crisis in 2015

One of the most significant manifestations of the current crisis is the mass death of migrants on their way to European countries. The term "crisis" in relation to immigrant refugees was first used in April 2015, when a series of maritime disasters occurred in the Mediterranean Sea. The reason for this is that most migrants choose the sea route to move to Europe, which involves risk to their lives.

2014	2015	2016
• 219 000 people • 1500 people drowned	• 1150000 people • 37000 people drowned	• 290000 • 3000 people drowned

Figure 1 - Number of people who crossed by sea to Europe [3]

According to figures cited by the Frontex agency, in 2015, 1 million 15 thousand migrants reached Europe by sea alone, which is 7 times more than in 2014. The main migration routes to the EU countries, according to the Frontex Agency, are presented in the figure 2.

Figure 2 - Main routes along which migrants reach Europe [5]

Most refugees reach Europe through the so-called ***Balkan route*** from Turkey through Greece, which received about 850 thousand people in 2015. Moreover, in December 2014 alone, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 106 thousand 776 people arrived in this country. The Balkan route, which is the main direction of refugee migration, in turn includes three main migration flows: the Eastern Mediterranean, the "circular" (from Albania to Greece) and the Western Balkan [6].

The ***Eastern Mediterranean route*** through Turkey to Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus brought 885,386 migrants to Europe in 2015. The largest group of migrants using this route are refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia.

The ***circular route from Albania to Greece*** is determined by migration across the land border between Greece and Albania. The specificity of this route is its irregularity. In 2015, 8,932 people arrived in Europe via this route. Since the beginning of 2016, this route has practically ceased to be used. At the same time, European analysts do not rule out that in the event of an escalation of tension in the Syrian conflict zone and a further exacerbation of the terrorist threat in the Near and Middle East, as well as in Libya, it may again acquire the character of one of the main directions of migration, including illegal.

The **Western Balkan route** includes two main migration flows:

– primary – from the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia);

– secondary – migrants who crossed the borders of the European Union through the land or sea Bulgarian-Turkish or Greek-Turkish border reach Hungary through the Western Balkans. This route is used by citizens of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, and sub-Saharan countries. In 2015, 764,038 people used this route on their way to Europe.

The other main refugee migration route to Europe is the so-called **Central Mediterranean route**: from Libya to Italy and Malta. This route is used by migrants from the Horn of Africa and West Africa. In 2015, 153,946 people arrived in Europe via this route. At the same time, earlier in 2011, this particular route was the main one for refugees from Libya, as well as migrants from the countries of Equatorial Africa. After the overthrow of M. Gaddafi, the number of refugees who used this route to arrive in Europe amounted to more than 200 thousand people [7].

West African route: from West African countries (Senegal, Mauritania) to the Canary Islands. This route is used mainly by citizens of Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Morocco and Senegal. In 2015, 874 people arrived in Europe via this route. Such a relatively small number of refugees against the general background makes this route little known. At the same time, the possibility of it acquiring a duplicating status in the event that other (Mediterranean) routes are closed is not excluded.

Western Mediterranean route: from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula via the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

This route is most often used by Algerian and Moroccan citizens trying to reach Spain, France and Italy. In 2015, 7,164 people used this route. According to European analysts, in the near future this route may become one of the main ones, taking into account the fact that in 2016 the flow of refugees from Libya to Italy doubled - the number of illegal immigrants arriving amounted to 24 thousand people. Representatives of Italian law enforcement agencies predict that in the near future the flow of migrants in this direction may increase significantly and turn into a real "storm from the sea." The basis for this conclusion is data from the EU External Border Control Agency Frontex, according to which more than half a million refugees are waiting to be transported to Europe in Libya.

In addition to these (main) routes, migrants have also mastered other routes. Thus, the eastern borders of the European Union are crossed by migrants **through the land border** between Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the eastern EU member states (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Overall, the scale of illegal migration along all eastern borders is much lower than along any other migration route into

the EU, accounting for 0.1% of the total. In 2015, 1,920 people used this route.

In 2015, the so-called **Arctic route** appeared through the territory of the Russian Federation to the land borders with Norway and Finland. Between October and December 2015, approximately 6,000 people, mostly from Afghanistan and Syria, used the route.

The main countries from which people are forced to migrate, according to the UN Refugee Agency, remain Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. So, from Syria only during 2015–2016. More than 4 million people left, of which more than 500 thousand migrated to European countries [5,7].

More than two million people left Afghanistan, of which about 171 thousand arrived as refugees in European countries in 2015. More than 60 thousand refugees arrived in Europe from Iraq. In addition, as noted, refugees from Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, as well as a number of countries in Equatorial Africa are arriving in Europe en masse (Figure 3).

Рисунок 3-Основные страны, из которых мигрировали люди [3]

There is practically no country in the European Union that is not affected by the migration crisis. To the greatest extent, the consequences of the influx of migrants are felt by such border countries of the European Union as Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, as well as the leading countries of the community - Germany, France and Great Britain, a number of Scandinavian countries, where there is a fairly high level of social benefits and there are large Muslim communities [8].

In Germany, according to the country's Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2015, about 1.1 million people were registered as refugee status

seekers. Thus, in less than a year, the country's population increased by almost 6%, and it increased not as a result of natural growth, but as a result of migration [9].

The situation with migrants is also developing in France, where the situation with migrants, as well as citizens of the country who come from French colonies, was already extremely acute. Paris pogroms of 2006, terrorist attacks of 2015-2016. indicate the presence of a permanent threat of escalation of the internal political situation on an ethno-confessional basis. Nevertheless, due to its obligations, France was forced to agree to accept about 30 thousand refugees in 2015 [10].

The UK did not escape the impact of the crisis, despite being fenced off from continental Europe by the straits. On the contrary, it is the straits, or rather the transport communications connecting it with France, that have become one of the most attractive objects of illegal migration.

In addition, the target of migration naturally became countries with a developed social security system, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, etc. Thus, the European continent and, first of all, the countries of the European Union faced a large-scale influx of refugees.

So, the features of the migration crisis in the EU in 2015 were (Figure 4):

The refugee problem is no longer a particular, regional or subregional one. It affected all EU countries, becoming the social dimension of globalization

The changing nature of the migration flow to Europe. If refugees used to be predominantly men, today whole families migrate to Europe

Merger of two streams of refugees - "political" and "economic"

Exiting the crisis requires previously unused, new, non-standard solutions from the EU leadership

Figure 4 - Features of the migration crisis in the EU in 2015

The given data on migrants is far from complete and does not take into account the number of refugees and internally displaced persons who are in refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and a number of other countries adjacent to armed conflict zones.

The frequency of local conflicts in the Greater Middle East and Africa, cruelty, anarchy and intransigence of the parties have made it

impossible - both physically and psychologically - for people to stay in these zones of confrontation. Their mass exodus to neighboring states caused a negative reaction from the local population and political leadership; the national economy of the host countries could not withstand such a load; thousands of newly arrived people could not or did not want to integrate into the established society. In addition, a number of states in the Greater Middle East do not allow migrants into their countries at all, and in some of them there is not even an official institution of refugees. Under these conditions, it is Europe, with its highly developed economy, developed social insurance system and political tolerance, that becomes the main target of the influx of refugees looking for a new happy and safe life in it.

2.3. Problems of managing and resolving the migration crisis in the EU

In September 2015, EU countries created a special quota program for the distribution of 120 thousand refugees to ease the situation with the reception of refugees in countries such as Italy, Hungary and Greece. The issue of refugee distribution was complicated by a number of contradictions between the European countries themselves, which were divided into two camps: those who were ready to accept refugees, and those who opposed the placement of migrants on their territory. Hungary opposed the provision of political asylum to refugees, as evidenced by the barbed wire fence erected on the Serbian-Hungarian border. The granting of political asylum was mainly opposed by Eastern European countries, which blamed only the states of Western Europe for the problems of the Middle East, considering them responsible for the migration crisis[11].

The Czech Republic and Poland took the same position, declaring their intention to remain a homogeneous society. These countries supported the voluntary distribution of refugees and did not support the decision to distribute quotas. The refugees themselves also did not want to stay in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, but strove to Western Europe, primarily to Germany. As a result, the decision on quotas was made according to the majority principle, which aggravated the reaction of countries in resolving the emerging migration crisis.

The situation with the acceptance and distribution of refugees was aggravated by the terrorist attack that occurred in France on the evening of November 13, 2015, which became the largest terrorist attack in the history of the country.

When EU countries faced a direct threat, states that opposed the distribution of quotas took an even more negative position on this issue. For example, Latvian President Raimonds Vējonis said that his state could not take on additional obligations to accommodate refugees, and the Polish authorities threatened that they were not going to fulfill obligations under refugee resettlement quotas, the Minister for European Union Affairs, Konrad Szymanski, spoke about this. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in turn, believes that the created mechanism for the distribution of refugees - quotas - should be permanent and mandatory for all EU countries. Otherwise, the Schengen zone is in danger of destruction [12].

Several summits were held on the migration crisis in the EU, it is necessary to note the main ones. The timing is in Figure 5.

On September 24, 2015, an emergency EU summit on migration was held in Brussels. 28 states made a joint decision to increase assistance to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, open refugee reception centers at the borders, confirmed their readiness to resettle refugees under quotas, emphasizing the fact that stabilization of the situation in conflict regions will ensure a reduction in the migration crisis [13].

September 24, 2015
- strengthening EU borders
- creation of reception, registration and sorting centers for refugees
- granting asylum only to persons who are in danger in their homeland

October 15-16, 2015
- strengthening EU borders
- creation of reception, registration and sorting centers for refugees
- granting asylum only to persons who are in danger in their homeland
- sending home economic migrants

November 11-12, 2015
- A €1.8 billion trust fund for Africa has been created
- Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and other African countries, in return for the money received, must provide places for refugees on the territory of their states
- The EU, in turn, promised African states visa concessions, as well as employment for qualified workers

November 20, 2015
- improvement of the border control system of Schengen member countries
- providing additional resources to the border agency Frontex
- introduction of a system for the exchange of data on air passengers, the adoption of emergency measures to combat the financing of terrorism, the exchange of intelligence information between police officers

Figure 5 - Management of the migration crisis

The next summit took place on 15–16 October 2015, during which the decisions discussed earlier were adopted: strengthening the EU's borders, creating reception, registration and triage centers for refugees, providing asylum only to those at risk in their home countries, and sending home economic migrants. It is interesting to note that within the framework of this summit, a list of "dangerous" and "safe" countries was developed. The participants confirmed the need to strengthen cooperation with countries through which the flow of refugees passes: Turkey, Libya, Jordan[14].

On November 11-12, 2015, a migration summit was held in the capital of Malta, which was attended by representatives of European and African countries, but no key decisions were made on the issue of the migration crisis in Europe. As part of the summit, an action plan was also adopted, which was coordinated with African states. A trust fund for Africa in the amount of €1.8 billion was created. Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and other African countries, in return for the money received, must provide places for refugees on the territory of their states, the EU, in turn, promised visa concessions to African states, as well as employment for qualified workers [15].

As part of the developed plan, the summit participating countries agreed on 15 initiatives that will help combat the crisis, and also focused on issues of legal and illegal migration, the return of migrants who are not in danger in their country and do not need asylum. One of the initiatives is information centers that will educate people about the threats of illegal migrant trafficking. To date, the EU has already adopted several similar Action Plans - with Turkey and the Balkan countries [16].

On November 20, 2015, the EU Council decided to begin tightening external border controls, while maintaining all Schengen principles. We are talking about improving the border control system of Schengen member countries, consisting of electronic connection to the relevant Interpol databases at all external border crossing points and the creation of automatic document verification systems, which should be completed by March 2016. "We must effectively strengthen control of the EU's external borders by providing additional resources to the border agency Frontex (the European Union's external border security agency), but we must also ensure adequate control of internal borders, since terrorists cross them freely," said French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve. . The initiatives of France were also confirmed on the issue of introducing a system for exchanging data on air passengers, taking emergency measures to combat the financing of terrorism, and exchanging intelligence information between police officers [16].

EU-Turkey cooperation

On November 29, 2015, a summit between Turkey and the EU was held in Brussels, within the framework of which the actions of Turkey and the EU were coordinated, a common action plan was approved, and financial assistance was allocated from the European Union.

Refugee resettlement plan

In May 2015, the EC proposed introducing quotas for the reception of migrants for all 28 EU countries. In June, the community countries agreed to voluntarily accommodate 40 thousand refugees. And in September, the EU adopted a plan to resettle another 120 thousand people from refugee camps in Italy and Greece over two years. However, subsequently the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia refused to accept refugees. In this regard, in September 2017, the EC proposed a new distribution scheme - 50 thousand people over two years - until October 2019. The EU allocated €500 million for these purposes [17].

In November 2015 and March 2016, the EU reached an agreement on migrant issues with Turkey, where the main flow of refugees heading to Europe accumulates. It provides for the exchange of illegal migrants for Syrian refugees who have received status in Turkey, on a one-for-one basis: illegal migrants will be returned to Turkey, and legal Syrian refugees will be resettled in the EU. Türkiye should return illegal non-Syrians to their countries [18].

In accordance with the agreements, the EU promised Turkey €6 billion - in two parts of €3 billion - financial assistance and intensified negotiations on accession to the EU. In mid-June 2017, European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos said that Brussels was fully fulfilling its obligations to Ankara, to which it had already transferred €2.9 billion of the promised up to €3 billion as part of the migration deal (€1 57 billion have already been disbursed - contracts for this amount have been signed aimed at providing assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey). In Turkey in 2015-2016 There were more than 3.5 million refugees[19].

Measures to curb the flow of migration in EU countries

In response to the crisis, the governments of almost all European countries have tightened migration standards - shortened the length of stay of candidates for refugee status, reduced the amount of benefits, and strengthened punitive mechanisms for expelling illegal immigrants from common European borders. The influx of displaced people has jeopardized the agreement on free movement within the Schengen zone.

Due to the aggravation of the migration situation in 2015-2016, eight countries temporarily introduced controls at certain borders - Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium. In March 2016, Slovenia and Croatia, in coordination with Serbia and

Macedonia (non-EU members), closed the Balkan route to refugees. Previously, the authorities of these states have repeatedly announced a reduction in asylum quotas [20].

Undoubtedly, along with the flow of refugees, Europe has been gripped by new problems that are directly related to the migration crisis (Figure 6).

Figure 6 - New problems as a consequence of the migration crisis

The first of them is the terrorist threat that comes from radical migrants. More than 4,000 ISIS militants have infiltrated along with refugees hoping to find safety in Europe. After the terrorist attack in France, it becomes clear that the threats from this terrorist group are not groundless.

The second problem is the spread of Islam. With the increased risk of terrorist attacks in France, as throughout Europe, there has been a growing distrust of Islam in general, rather than of a specific terrorist group.

The third problem is the problem of differences in mentality, traditions and customs. Given the fact that European countries are oversaturated with migrants with different views and values, often incomparable with the values of the West, Europeans fear the aggressive manifestation of customs and traditions on the part of refugees that are contrary to Western culture. Europeans are beginning to fear a situation in which they may become strangers on their own territory. This was stated by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban: "The reality is that Europe is facing a massive influx of people, tens of millions of people could come to Europe, we may suddenly realize that we are in the minority on our own continent" [21]. There is a negative attitude among local residents towards refugees; the situation was seriously aggravated by the terrorist attacks in Paris. Local groups who do not want to accept refugees are demonstrating.

On October 14, 2015, in Talin, thousands of civilians rallied against the acceptance of refugees. On October 20, a migrant camp was set on

fire in Sweden; this was the fifth arson attack in October 2015. One of the demonstrations took place in the city of Cologne on October 25, the demonstrators made statements that refugees do not want to live according to the rules of Western society, so they do not belong in Europe. On October 28, rallies against migrants took place in Czech cities; more than 3,000 people took part in them. On November 8, 2015 in Paris, a demonstration also took place near the Hungarian Embassy in Paris in favor of supporting the Hungarian government on the issue of closing the country's borders to refugees [22].

The fourth problem is economic in nature. European countries need to pay benefits to refugees, and although many countries have cut it in half, quite a lot of money is spent on this. In addition, a huge flow of money is flowing towards African countries, Turkey and others to create various joint initiatives in order to stop potential migrants in their countries of origin. It is not yet clear how much support EU member states will be willing to give to countries that absorb huge numbers of war refugees.

Representatives of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, as well as individual countries provide recommendations to the EU on how to cope with the modern migration crisis.

For example, William Lacy Swing, being the head of the International Organization for Migration, proposes solving the migration crisis in Europe only by political methods, and identifies the existing conflicts in the Middle East, as well as North-South inequality, as the main causes of the crisis. Until these conflicts are resolved, people will continue to be driven by the desire to find a better life, which they believe will open up for them in Europe [23].

To summarize, it is necessary to highlight the main steps that the EU must take to reduce the migration crisis in the near future:
— despite the fact that African countries oppose the placement of registration centers for refugees on their territory, this could become one of the components of solving the problems of the migration crisis that Europe is facing;
— a rapid response to large flows of refugees is necessary, European countries should quickly decide the issue of who should leave and who should stay. During the period September-October 2015, only 569 migrants were sent outside the European Union, and on September 30, 9 thousand new migrants arrived in one day [9];
— European Union countries need to carry out a number of reforms in the field of providing asylum to migrants and refugees;
— more information campaigns should be carried out to explain to migrants the real situation in Europe;

— it is necessary to provide non-military support in resolving conflict issues in Africa and the Middle East;
— it is necessary to promote measures to combat new security threats, such as terrorism, religious extremism and separatism;
— reduce benefits given to migrants in order, on the one hand, to stimulate their desire to quickly integrate into European society, and on the other hand, to stop the flow of potential migrants to Europe.

Swiss President Simonetta Sommaruga believes that the success of resolving the migration crisis lies in the coordination of actions between European countries, partial renunciation of their national interests in the name of peace and stability [24].

Thus, the migration crisis that European countries are facing at the present stage is the largest since the Second World War. In the near future, European countries will not be able to completely resolve the issue with migrants, but European countries already understand that they must act together and are taking the right steps towards solving emerging problems. The only key to eliminating the root causes of the migration crisis, and therefore the crisis itself, is to resolve the situation in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and other states, which, however, does not seem possible in the next decade.

Chapter 3. THE UKRAINIAN MIGRATION CRISIS 2022: DYNAMICS, SCALE, CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EU

3.1. The first stage of the crisis

On February 24, 2022, the world's largest migration crisis since World War II began. Before him, the most massive migration was considered to be the movement of population due to changes in the eastern borders of Germany after 1945, covering about 17 million people. [1, p.114]. During the Ukrainian migration crisis, according to the UNHCR for Refugees, more than 8 million refugees were registered as of mid-July 2023 [2]. Their number turned out to be several times greater than during the European migration crisis of 2015, when 1.2 million migrants from the countries of the Middle East and Africa arrived illegally in EU countries in a relatively short period of time [3, p.4.]. Thus, the Ukrainian crisis became the largest population displacement in the last 75 years.

Migration flows from the territory of Ukraine have had a strong impact on all countries located in its immediate vicinity. In many of them, especially where before the war the Ukrainian diaspora was one of the largest - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states - immigrants from Ukraine became the largest national minority, having a significant impact on the demographic and ethnic situation. On the demography of Ukraine itself, mass emigration had a catastrophic impact, causing a sharp decline in the population, especially children, youth and age groups who are of working age. The decline in the population of Ukraine as a result of mass emigration and the annexation of four south-eastern regions to Russia turned out to be, apparently, one of the largest in modern European history.

Two years later, on February 24, 2024, about six and a half million Ukrainians live abroad, mainly in Europe, and another 3.7 million have the status of internally displaced persons.

In the first week of a full-scale war alone, a million people left Ukraine. At first, the majority remains in neighboring countries - Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, and most of all - in Poland. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of March 2, 2022, almost 550 thousand Ukrainians are staying in Poland. 88 thousand – moving on [4].

As of April 1, 2022, according to the UN, 4 million 465 thousand refugees arrived in countries bordering Ukraine. The population of Ukraine as of January 1, 2022 was estimated by the Ukrainian statistical agency at 34.5 million people. Consequently, during the first five weeks of the development of the migration crisis, about 13% of the population, or every eighth resident of Ukraine, emigrated [5].

The internal migration crisis turned out to be even more widespread. According to UNHCR for Refugees, 6.5 million people in Ukraine fled the fighting without crossing borders with foreign countries and became internally displaced persons. The emigration of the population liable for military service - men aged 18 to 60 years - was prevented by the ban on their travel abroad, introduced by the Ukrainian authorities on February 24, 2022. In the regions of Western and right-bank parts of Central Ukraine, where the majority of internally displaced persons ended up, in the spring of 2022, another refugee crisis. About 13 million people, according to UN estimates, were in combat-affected areas that they could not leave due to security threats or transport infrastructure destroyed during the fighting.

At the first stage of the migration crisis, the majority of Ukrainian refugees crossed the western border of Ukraine and ended up in the border countries of Eastern Europe, from where some of them moved on in transit. Of the 4.5 million refugees during the end of February - March 2022, 2 million 405.7 thousand (53.4%) crossed the border with Poland. The second place in the number of refugees arrived was taken by Romania, on whose territory 626.9 thousand people (14.1%) ended up. In the four other countries bordering Ukraine, the number of refugees fluctuated between 350–400 thousand. 391.6 thousand (8.8%) arrived in Moldova, 380 thousand (8.5%) in Hungary, 350.6 thousand in Russia . (7.9%), to Slovakia – 350 thousand (6.6%) [6].

As of February 2024, statistics on refugees from Ukraine in Europe (February 24, 2022 - April 16, 2024) are as follows.
— more than 4.2 million registrations for temporary protection in the EU;

— almost a third of Ukraine's population remains displaced: there are 6.3 million Ukrainian refugees worldwide, mostly concentrated in Europe, 62% of them women;
— 868,613 Ukrainian students are already integrated into the national school systems of EU countries;
— 49,520 applications for asylum by Ukrainian citizens in the EU.

In general, the number of employed Ukrainians is growing - in March 2023, more than a million refugees in the EU already had a job. By October their number almost doubles. The highest figure – almost 70% of employed Ukrainians – is in Poland. According to the European Commissioner for Employment and Social Rights, Nicolas Schmit, Ukrainians "helped reduce the labor shortage in the EU."

In 2024, there will be six million Ukrainian refugees living in Europe. The largest number is in Germany, 1.14 million (although Eurostat cites an even higher figure - 1.23 million) [7].

3.2. The European Union migration regulation: reception of refugees

Following Russia's military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU responded urgently and showed solidarity in action to support people in need. This included direct humanitarian assistance, civil emergency assistance, border support, and the provision of protection to those fleeing war.

For the first time in its history, the European Union introduced the **Temporary Protection Directive**, which established legal rules to regulate mass arrivals of people. In parallel, the European Commission quickly began coordinating with EU countries to collect information on the situation on the ground and prevent trafficking in persons.

The Directive on temporary protection for refugees from Ukraine was activated in the EU days after the Russian invasion of the country. The system was developed after the Balkan wars in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The Directive of 20 July 2001 on "minimum standards for the provision of temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons" was developed in the context of the mass arrival of refugees from the former Yugoslavia to Germany in 1999. Temporary protection status is granted to the applicant immediately for 6 months with the possibility of extending several once every three years in exceptional cases where "there is a risk that the asylum system of

Member States will not be able to cope with the influx without consequences that impede its proper functioning" [8].

The Directive is implemented on the initiative of the Commission or at the request of a Member State and is adopted by a qualified majority vote in the Council of the EU. The European Parliament must be informed of the Council decision, which confirms the massive influx of displaced persons and takes into account the Member State's hosting capacity, of which they must notify the Council in advance.

Those receiving temporary protection are immediately provided with social and financial assistance, a residence permit, they can move freely within the Schengen zone, are given the right to work, the opportunity to undergo vocational training, take advantage of medical care, and children have access to the education system in member states. Temporary protection status allows its holder to stay in the European Union for the entire period of the directive and apply for asylum [9]. Its goal is to prevent asylum systems from being overloaded during a massive influx of refugees into the EU. In fact, people fleeing war receive residence permits quickly and without bureaucratic procedures.

By the beginning of March, according to UNHCR, more than 1 million people left Ukraine; five EU countries accepted them, with Poland being the most [10]. Such statistics, indicating a large-scale migration influx into the EU, gave rise to the Council of the Ministers of the Interior, at the request of the Commission, to unanimously adopt a Decision on March 3 to activate the directive, which came into force after publication in the Official Journal of the EU on March 4 [11]. In addition, the Commission justified the introduction of temporary protection by the fact that people were coming from one region, in contrast to the "mixed flows" observed in 2015. However, contrary to the Commission's proposal to introduce a three-year period of "temporary protection", Member States approved the extension of status to only two years. Separately, ministers agreed on mechanisms for the repatriation to the country of origin of students who arrived in the EU as displaced persons.

While welcoming the unanimous decision to put the directive into effect, the Commission was still forced to remind member states of the "challenges" of the million-strong migration influx. Thus, it turned out to be much more difficult for ministers to reach agreement on the status of third-country citizens who fled from Ukraine to the European Union. Some states, Poland at the forefront, insisted on applying temporary protection only to people with Ukrainian passports. The French presidency managed to lead the Council to a compromise, according to which third-country nationals were able to claim national, but not European temporary protection. On the other hand, Poland and other

countries close to Ukraine initially decided not to seek help from their partners in receiving and resettling refugees, which greatly puzzled them.

During the summit on March 24 in Brussels, EU leaders agreed on further measures to accept refugees from Ukraine, of whom by that time there were already 3.7 million [12], and called on the Commission to ensure the timely receipt of funds allocated for these purposes. The heads of state and government were forced to admit that the new crisis "poses a serious challenge to the infrastructure and public services" of member states, especially those bordering Ukraine, and therefore asked the Commission to work on "additional proposals" to strengthen their financial support [13].

The Coast and Land Guard Agency (Frontex) also got involved in organizing the reception of refugees, deploying its units on the EU borders with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Europol sent its employees to the border with Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland.

Remembering the lessons of the previous migration crisis, member states began to coordinate the reception and transportation of refugees. The Commission expressed its intention to coordinate this process on the basis of the Solidarity Platform, as well as to propose measures to streamline the registration carried out in national databases. The Solidarity Platform is developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for identifying those receiving temporary protection, distributing them and delivering them to member states.

EU interior ministers in Brussels, at the Council meeting on March 28, approved the "10-point Action Plan" developed by the Commission, which included proposals for coordinating the actions of member states. According to the Commission, the Council intends to address a serious problem - the lack of access to national data on the number of arrivals in the EU, which inevitably leads to confusion and duplication in the provision of temporary protection. A way out of this situation could be a pan-European "registration platform", which is proposed to be developed with the involvement of the EuLISA agency, which coordinates the work of EU information systems.

Much attention is paid to combating trafficking in persons in the Action Plan, as well as in the Commission's Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive [14]. The Commission and Council fear that criminal groups may take advantage of the vulnerability of arriving women and children for sexual or labor exploitation. Member States are strongly encouraged to take appropriate preventive measures: at border crossings and accommodation sites, provide information about the risks of human trafficking in a language understandable to people leaving Ukraine; for unaccompanied minors, do this in a convenient and age-appropriate manner.

At the end of September, EU interior ministers, at the proposal of the European Commission, extended the validity of the directive until March 2025.

Migration and Crisis Preparedness Plan [15]

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission has coordinated the EU response through the EU Migration and Crisis Preparedness Plan.

The Migration and Crisis Preparedness Plan provides an operational framework to ensure:

– situational awareness and increased readiness,

– effective management and timely response.

In cooperation with Member States and EU institutions, the said plan is actively involved in collecting and reporting information on the latest developments. Information is collected and disseminated to better regulate migration.

Border control

To help EU border services effectively control arrivals at the borders with Ukraine, while reducing waiting times while maintaining a high level of security, the Commission issued Guidelines on external border controls on 2 March 2022[1].

The guidelines include provisions regarding:

– simplification of border control at the EU borders with Ukraine;

– flexibility regarding entry conditions;

– permitting crossing at temporary border points outside the official border crossing points;

– simplified access for rescue services and humanitarian aid;

– personal belongings and pets.

The guidelines strongly encourage EU countries to use the support of EU agencies: Frontex can help with identity verification and registration of arriving people, and Europol can use staff to provide support to EU countries during secondary checks.

EU institutions play a key role in helping EU countries on the ground with border controls, information exchange, asylum registration and preventing abuse of vulnerable populations by criminal networks.

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[1] Commission Communication Providing operational guidelines for external border management to facilitate border crossings at the EU-Ukraine borders 2022/C 104 I/01 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOC_2022_104_I_0001&qid=1646422292305

3.3. The EU migration policy. What will change in 2024-2025?

On the issue of migration, the EU's three largest economies - Germany, France and Italy - are politically moving in the same direction. But at the national level, conditions for migrants and their asylum in these countries differ greatly from each other.

Migration legislation in Germany

The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) assumed that in 2023, 350 thousand of the more than one million asylum seekers in the EU will apply for refugee status in Germany. In addition to asylum seekers who mostly came from Syria, Afghanistan and Turkey, more than a million Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war have entered the country. The ruling coalition responded to the situation with migrants and refugees by adopting a number of laws.

One of them is a law that makes conditions easier for migrants who have lived in the country for more than five years. Now they have a better chance of legal work in Germany and integration. Another law passed, on the contrary, regulates the return of illegal migrants to their home countries (Rückführungsverbesserungsgesetz) and allows for the acceleration of the process of deportation to their countries of origin or to third countries of those who have been refused asylum in Germany. According to this law, their homes can now be searched, and the period from notification of deportation to actual deportation is reduced. But the period of permissible detention of a person who should be deported is extended. However, it is now difficult to implement these innovations in practice. Of the 50 thousand people who should be deported from Germany, according to the German Ministry of the Interior, only 7,900 people were deported in the first half of 2023.

Another bill provides for easier rights to obtain citizenship in Germany. If adopted, Germany will be allowed to have two citizenships. And the waiting period for obtaining citizenship will be reduced from eight to five years. If an applicant for German citizenship holds anti-Semitic or racist views, this may be a reason for denial of citizenship.

France tightens immigration laws

The French National Assembly passed a controversial immigration law shortly before Christmas, thanks to the votes of the right-wing populist National Rally party. Party Chairman Marine Le Pen declared an ideological victory for her political course, pursued under the slogan "France First."

Liberal President Emmanuel Macron's support in parliament did not depend on the votes of right-wing populists, but on conservative Republicans, who, however, voted to tighten immigration rules.

Macron now intends to submit the law to the Constitutional Council for consideration. The new document provides for the accelerated deportation of illegal migrants, complicates their access to social benefits and limits the ability of their family members to enter the country. International students who want to study in France will now be required by law to provide a deposit before coming to study. 70 percent of the French, according to opinion polls, supported tightening immigration laws.

Italy against the influx of illegal immigrants

The right-wing populist coalition led by Giorgi Meloni, which won the 2022 elections thanks, among other things, to reducing the number of migrants arriving in Italy, now wants to show results. Thus, an agreement was reached with the EU and the Tunisian government on the possibility of deporting illegal immigrants, which, however, was not implemented. The Italian Prime Minister also signed an agreement with Albania that two centers for refugees for 3,000 people will be moved to Albanian territory from Italy. Albania is recognized as a safe third country for asylum seekers and is negotiating accession to the EU. Now the Supreme Court of Albania is checking how legal the deal with Italy is. In addition, Meloni instructed the army to build camps for deportees in less densely populated regions of the country. Migrants who are supposed to be deported can stay there instead of 12 months 18, during which the departments will decide on their deportation.

The umbrella group for European organizations dealing with refugees, ECRE, criticizes the Italian authorities in its report for making the asylum process more difficult and lengthy. Asylum seekers have to wait months for necessary administrative procedures.

Many migrants do not stay in Italy and head further north to Germany and Austria to seek asylum there, although according to the Dublin agreements Italy must accept them as the first EU country they reach. The country's authorities refuse to accept those migrants whom Germany sends back to Italy.

Migration and related political issues are high on the agenda in Europe ahead of European Parliament elections in the summer of 2024. In 2015, the illegal influx of migrants into Europe, accompanied by an increase in terrorist attacks, forced the European Union to establish new rules for controlling migration. The Pact on Migration and Refugees, designed to change the face of European migration policy, was adopted by members of the European Parliament in Brussels on April 10, 2024.

It is aimed at creating a mechanism of "forced solidarity". The Migration and Refugees Pact introduces a screening process for asylum seekers at European Union borders. The first country of entry will be responsible for referring migrants to the standard or expedited asylum process or rejecting their claim through fingerprinting, photographing, verification of identity documents, etc.

The agreement provides for the creation of closed centers with a capacity of 30,000 places to accommodate migrants during initial control. The pact aims to create a mechanism of "enforced solidarity" for a fairer distribution of refugees in areas where asylum seekers are concentrated in southern European countries and in other European countries. Every year, 30,000 refugees will be "resettled" in another EU country while their claims are processed. Countries that go against this principle will have to pay a fine of 20,000 euros for each refugee rejected.

According to the Agency for Operational Cooperation on the Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), the number of illegal border crossings across Europe has increased significantly in 2023. It is estimated that approximately 380,000 people entered the EU illegally in 2023, with more than 1 million asylum requests made [16].

The new Asylum and Migration Management Regulation aims to respond more effectively to the complex challenges of migration and asylum in the European Union (EU). The new solidarity mechanism is being introduced because the existing system overburdens several member countries and is considered unfair. This mechanism is intended to share responsibility more fairly.

The new mechanisms provide flexibility in supporting mandatory solidarity, allowing Member States to contribute as they wish. Contributions can take various forms, such as resettlement, financial support and alternative solidarity measures. In particular, the resettlement of asylum seekers and persons under international protection forms the basis of solidarity among Member States.

For example, Member States experiencing strong migration pressure at the EU's external borders are obliged to resettle asylum seekers to other countries. In this context, the minimum annual number of relocations is 30,000. In addition, Member States, supported by financial contributions and other solidarity measures, must manage flows of asylum seekers and migrants more effectively.

These new mechanisms represent significant changes to EU asylum and migration policies. In particular, it is important to strengthen solidarity among Member States and process asylum applications more fairly. However, for the effective implementation of these provisions and for the

EU to successfully manage asylum and migration crises, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation and coordination between Member States.

Recent changes to EU migration and asylum policies have been the subject of widespread public debate across Europe. A recent Ipsos poll of almost 26,000 respondents from 18 EU member states revealed the European public's views on migration policy. According to the survey results, the majority of Europeans negatively assess the impact of EU migration policy and call for strengthening borders [17].

The poll, conducted ahead of the European Parliament elections on June 6-9, 2024, found that 51 percent of Europeans rate the impact of the bloc's migration policies as "negative." At the same time, 16 percent of respondents adhere to a "positive" point of view, and 32 percent have neither a positive nor a negative opinion.

If we analyze the survey results by country, the new migration policy is most criticized by France (62%), Austria (60%) and Hungary (58%). Denmark (26%), Romania (27%) and Finland (32%) stand out as the least critical countries. Poland (86%), Bulgaria (83%) and Finland (83%) are most supportive of the action plan [17].

The harshest criticism of the new migration plan comes from supporters of the far-right Identity and Democracy party (78%) and right-wing European conservatives and reformists (65%). The greatest support is provided by left-wing groups (55%).

Chapter 4. MIGRATION POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN REGARD TO REFUGEES

4.1. **Problems of integration of refugees in the countries of the European Union**

4.2. **The impact of refugees on the spread of extremism and the rise of xenophobic sentiments in Europe**

4.3. **Prospects for the development of the European Union refugee policy**

4.1 Problems of integration of refugees in the countries of the European Union

The mobility of people, to one degree or another and for various reasons, is an integral feature of the 21st century for Europe and the world. With the increase in the number of third-country nationals arriving in Europe in recent years, integration has become a decisive issue. However, the level of experience with integration issues varies greatly across EU countries.

Receiving refugees fleeing war or putting their lives at risk in their own country is considered a complex process. By fleeing, refugees leave their homeland, where they share their national, cultural and religious roots, for a country with a different culture, religion and way of life. If we look at the example of Europe, then according to statistics, the top three countries in terms of the number of refugees include the countries of the Middle East (Syria) and the countries of South Asia (Afghanistan). It is important to note that refugees face many challenges: in addition to fleeing to survive, they have to adapt to a host country culture that is very different from their previous one.

The movement of people between states, whether refugees or migrants, occurs in a context in which sovereignty remains important, and in particular that aspect of sovereign competence which gives a state the right to exercise prima facie exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and to decide which non-citizens are allowed to enter and remain, while citizens are denied entry and required or forced to leave

the country [1]. Like any sovereign power, this competence must be exercised within the limits and in accordance with the law, and the State's right to control the admission of non-citizens is subject to certain clearly defined exceptions, inter alia, in favor of those seeking asylum. Moreover, a state that seeks to exercise migration control outside its territory, for example through the physical interception, suppression and return of asylum seekers and forced migrants, may also be liable for actions that violate those of its international obligations that apply beyond outside its territory.

The process of accepting refugees is complex. Groups of people fighting for their lives, fleeing war and conflict in their countries, are leaving their homes, their families and their homelands. For refugees, this is a huge psychological burden: changing the country of residence, fighting for life, waiting for the end of a war that does not know whether there will be an end, a change of environment, culture of behavior, acclimatization and adaptation.

Despite the efforts made and the improvements observed, many challenges remain and much of the potential that third country nationals bring remains untapped. In the EU, third-country nationals continue to fare worse than EU nationals in terms of employment, education and social inclusion. This means that the EU needs to step up its support for the development of effective integration strategies.

Ensuring that all those who are rightfully in the EU, regardless of the length of their stay, can participate and contribute is key to the well-being, prosperity and cohesion of European societies. At a time when discrimination, prejudice, racism and xenophobia are on the rise, there are legal, moral and economic imperatives to protect fundamental EU rights, values and freedoms and work for a more cohesive society.

Today, about 20 million third-country nationals reside legally in the EU [2]. They make up more than four percent of the total population. Evidence shows that migrants disproportionately suffer disadvantages in terms of education, employment and access to basic services such as health care and decent housing. Forty percent of employers in the EU report difficulty finding employees with the required skills. Europe's population is also aging. Migration and successful integration of third-country nationals can mitigate these impacts and help maintain the competitiveness of the EU economy.

Although integration competence lies primarily with individual countries, the EU can take measures to provide incentives and support to EU members to facilitate the integration of third-country nationals legally resident on their territory. Many EU countries are currently facing similar challenges and the EU plays an important role in supporting, stimulating and coordinating integration actions and policies.

EU actions are based on a "multi-stakeholder" approach involving all relevant partners [3]. The Commission aims to work not only with national authorities, but also with local and regional authorities on integration issues. Municipalities and regions play an extremely important role in integration as they implement local policies and provide basic, essential services such as housing and education.

The EU's role is to coordinate action to help member states respond effectively to various integration challenges, bringing together national and local policymakers in the fields of health, housing and education to share experiences and promote mutual learning.

Refugee integration is a dynamic and multifaceted two-way process that requires the efforts of all stakeholders, including the willingness of refugees to adapt to the host society without having to give up their own cultural identity, as well as a corresponding willingness on the part of the refugees. participation of host communities and government agencies to welcome refugees and meet the needs of a diverse population. The process of integration is complex and gradual and involves separate but interrelated legal, economic, social and cultural aspects, each of which is important to the ability of refugees to successfully integrate as productive members of society.

Although immigrant integration policies fall under the jurisdiction of Member States and are therefore a national competence, there are a number of EU measures, starting with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, that support the EU's mandate to "provide incentives and support for the actions of EU Member States" to promote integration citizens of third countries." Periodically, "the EU sets priorities and targets for the implementation of EU policies, legislative proposals and funding opportunities since the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam." However, it was not until 2003 (European Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment) that the European Commission took a more comprehensive view of integration policy. An important difference from the previous approach was that integration was defined as "a two-way process based on the reciprocity of the rights and responsibilities of third-country nationals and host societies" and that the goal was the "full participation" of immigrants. Following this, the Common Basic Principles (CBP) of 2004 became the first step towards creating a common framework "that will guide the majority of EU actions in the field of integration" [4, p.51]. With the increasing number of refugees arriving in Europe in recent years, integration has become a critical issue (Figure 1).

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support the EU's mandate to "provide incentives and support for the actions of EU Member States" to promote integration citizens of third countries." Periodically, "the EU sets priorities and targets for the implementation of EU policies, legislative proposals and funding opportunities since the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam." However, it was not until 2003 (European Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment) that the European Commission took a more comprehensive view of integration policy. An important difference from the previous approach was that integration was defined as "a two-way process based on the reciprocity of the rights and responsibilities of third-country nationals and host societies" and that the goal was the "full participation" of immigrants. Following this, the Common Basic Principles (CBP) of 2004 became the first step towards creating a common framework "that will guide the majority of EU actions in the field of integration" [4, p.51]. With the increasing number of refugees arriving in Europe in recent years, integration has become a critical issue.

Migrants from new EU member states may also face highly nationalized demands for integration or even be classified as undesirables, as demonstrated by the most extreme and brutal treatment of Roma immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania in France [5].

The official EU website on integration (The European Web Site on Integration), which was created in 2009 and currently contains a summary of past and current policies, as well as information on current activities in this area, offers a periodization of EU integration policies, including four main phases:

1) 1999-2004 (called the "Genesis of the Common Policy") from the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 to the Tampere Declaration in 2004, in which Member States agreed that the aim of such policies should be to provide third-country nationals with rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens;

2) 2005-2010 (the so-called "Knowledge Exchange"), from the EU Common Integration Program in 2005 (in which the strategy of the main framework for a "coherent EU approach" and the implementation of EU integration policies was built through a series of supporting EU mechanisms and instruments to promote integration and facilitate exchanges between integration participants) until 2010;

3) 2011-2015 (called "Integration Funding"), from the updated European Program for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals adopted in 2011 (which focuses on enhancing the economic, social, cultural and political participation of migrants and combating discrimination). In addition, this initiative examined pre-arrival measures and the role of countries of origin in integration, meaning that it added a

third key actor to the process of migrant integration and thus defined it as a "tripartite process");

4) From 2016 to now (the so-called "Holistic Approach"): Since the 2016 Action Plan, the emphasis has been on the benefits of greater diversity, which can only be realized if integration becomes a two-way process. Such a process involves changes in EU host societies and their institutions.

Successful integration therefore requires meaningful interaction between migrants and the host society, which means that integration should be viewed as a two-way process (Third Country Nationals Action Plan, 2016). In fact, the Action Plan includes "preliminary measures" and therefore considers integration as a "tripartite process". The field of education represents an important framework for policies and actions aimed at the integration of migrant children, as well as in the fields of social inclusion, health, etc., drawing on several policies, resources, funding and networks [5].

During these periods, the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (together with the Council of Ministers) developed three five-year programs that formulated policy goals and priorities for this period. These were the Tampere Program (1999-2004), the Hague Program (2005-2010) and the Stockholm Program (2010-2014). The Tampere program focused on combating cultural, economic and social discrimination with the aim of achieving a stronger integration policy that would bring the rights and obligations of third country nationals (TCNs) on a par with those of EU citizens. This included the right to education.

The Hague program, initiated in the wake of 9/11 and the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, focused on border controls and illegal migration for security purposes. To achieve its goals of cohesion and stability through integration, the program asked member states to create equal opportunities for third-country nationals to fully participate in society. The program viewed integration as a two-way process between migrants and actors in the country of migration, which achieved education and employment. The Commission's 2005 action plan defined integration as maximizing the positive impacts of migration on society and the economy, and preventing exclusion and social exclusion of migrant communities. During the Hague Programme, the Council developed a set of eleven common core principles for the policy of immigrant integration in the European Union (2005) [6].

Finally, the Stockholm Agenda called for consolidation and better assessment, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation. He focused on economic market needs and circular migration as he responded to the economic crisis. The program did not prioritize integration, but defined integration as having rights, responsibilities and

opportunities at its core, and as a policy area that should exist in coordination with other related areas such as education, employment and social inclusion. The 2010 Action Plan developed within the framework of the program addressed new opportunities that arose after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. He called for EU migration policy to focus on solidarity and responsibility, and called for flexibility and a focus on achieving a common level of rights and responsibilities comparable to those of EU citizens. Such obligations included migrants' responsibility for their own integration.

Implementation of the Integration Action Plan for 2016. In June 2016, the European Commission presented an Action Plan for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which sets out 50 actions to support Member States and other actors in their efforts to promote the integration of migrants. Beyond the five key thematic areas, further proposals aim to improve coordination, use of funding and monitoring.

Taking into account the analysis of migration in this study, it is important to say that the EU has had a lot of experience in welcoming refugees and migrants, especially in 2015-2016 when they faced a huge influx of refugees and have since implemented numerous directives to work collectively and help people find shelter. As we see from Ukrainian refugees, they have learned from the mistakes of past years and taken into account all the flows. The EU still continues to grapple with the refugee problem and it is important to note that migration has moved to the forefront of the global political agenda. International migration has accompanied humanity throughout history. The peculiarity of the modern stage is that this process has become global in the strict sense.

It is obvious that from year to year the number of refugees and asylum seekers is only increasing. Unfortunately, "old" wars do not end when new wars begin, and this leads to new flows of refugees. The EU, countering the uncontrolled flow of refugees, is developing its migration policy based on its past experience. Despite the dangers of accepting refugees fearing terrorism and international crime, the EU is inclined to offer its assistance.

Action before a migrant or refugee arrives in an EU Member State can significantly speed up and improve integration. For a new arrival, a basic level of understanding of the new home, its language, culture and people before leaving can ensure realistic expectations and rapid integration. For host communities, pre-arrival measures can help overcome prejudice and foster acceptance. Not a single point of the Action Plan has yet been implemented. Education and training are among the most powerful tools for inclusion. Knowledge of the language, acquisition of basic skills and understanding of the laws, culture and values of the host society are the basis for further learning and the

gateway to employment and social inclusion. Equipping teachers with the necessary skills to prevent educational segregation and use education as the main tool for the integration of families and children from third countries is also the basis of social inclusion. Employment is a fundamental part of the integration process. Promoting labor market integration through employment or vocational training is a mutually beneficial endeavor for migrants and host countries. For migrants, finding work is fundamental to becoming part of the economic and social life of the host country. Their integration into the labor market could also help meet growing needs for specific skills in the EU and improve the sustainability of member states' social security systems.

Integration is an active role in the local, regional and national community, and integration policy is the development and maintenance of real contacts between people. In this context, volunteering, sports and cultural activities can be particularly effective in facilitating exchanges between migrants and host communities. Therefore, policies should promote a positive approach to diversity, ensure equal rights and freedoms for all and combat discrimination.

The European Commission has presented a new EU Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion (2021–2027). Responsibility for integration policy lies primarily with the member states. However, the EU has adopted a wide range of measures to stimulate and support national, as well as regional and local authorities and civil society in their efforts to promote integration. The current action plan proposes concrete actions, makes recommendations and identifies funding for initiatives to ensure inclusion for all.

Key actions include:

1) inclusive education and training from early childhood to higher education, with a focus on easier recognition of qualifications and lifelong language learning, supported by EU funds;

2) Improving employability and skills recognition to fully value the contributions of migrant communities, and women in particular, and ensure they are supported to realize their full potential. The EC will work with relevant stakeholders to promote labor market inclusion, support entrepreneurship and facilitate the recognition and valuation of skills by employers;

3) Promoting access to health services, including mental health care, for people with migrant backgrounds. In addition to targeted EU funding, the action plan aims to ensure people are informed of their rights and recognizes the specific challenges women face, especially during and after pregnancy. The Action Plan also helps Member States share best practices;

4) Access to adequate and affordable housing financed through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) and Invest EU, as well as the exchange of experience at local and regional levels to combat discrimination in the housing market and segregation.

Thus, successful integration requires meaningful interaction between migrants and the host society, which means that integration should be viewed as a two-way process. Therefore, policies should promote a positive approach to diversity, ensure equal rights and freedoms for all and combat discrimination.

4.2 The impact of refugees on the spread of extremism and the rise of xenophobic sentiments in Europe

Refugees leaving their homeland leave not only their country, but also their national, cultural and religious roots, moving to a country with a different culture, religion and way of life. If you look at the example of Europe, then according to statistics, the top three countries with the largest number of refugees are the countries of the Middle East (Syria) and the countries of South Asia (Afghanistan). It is important to note that refugees face many difficulties: in addition to escaping in the struggle for life, they have to adapt to the behavioral culture of the host country, which is very different from the previous one [5, p. 150].

As a rule, extremist and terrorist actions require organization and their own social base, as well as a center of radical sentiment. These are often places of discontent, people psychologically exposed to violence. In this context, refugee camps are unsafe places because they are generally under-secured.

Refugee camps are often synonymous with suffering and lack of prospects for those who have to wait there for change for the better. Like prisons, they can become breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. Just over half of the world's refugees are under 18 years of age. Young people are more likely to join terrorist groups than older people. Indefinite stay in such camps opens up opportunities for the recruitment of terrorists and guerrillas.

Although refugee camps are usually closed areas far from the population centers of host countries, some of those who were expelled from their countries for political reasons live legally in host countries and form diasporas, mainly in urban areas. They are joined by compatriots who come to the West as family members (for example, through

arranged marriages that allow migration to the West), as students, or in some other capacity.

When migrants leave their country of origin, they are rarely able to leave their past behind. The enmity that led to conflict in the home country often continues in the new host country - the conflicts seem to have become portable. For example, many Indians and Pakistanis brought the conflict between their home countries with them to the UK. When the British colonial power left India in 1947/48, it engineered partition that displaced more than 15 million people and resulted in the massacre of one to two million Indians and Pakistanis, leaving traumatic scars on people on both sides of India. Many Pakistanis and Indians, even those abroad, still regard each other as quasi-enemies.

When asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants reach a host country in large numbers, local xenophobic resistance sometimes arises. It comes in two directions: targeting asylum seekers and economic migrants on the one hand, and the liberals and social democrats who welcome them on the other. Xenophobic resistance to economic migrants and asylum seekers in Europe largely takes the form of burning asylum centers with Molotov cocktails. Firebomb attacks and similar attacks using iron rods, axes and sand knives have occurred in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK. In Sweden, which received more than 160,000 asylum seekers (including 35,000 unaccompanied minors) in 2015 alone, there were approximately 50 attacks on asylum seekers, more than in previous years combined [6].

Refugees can influence the spread of extremism and the growth of the terrorist threat in two ways. First, their presence could make terrorism less costly in the EU. For example, foreign terrorist organizations can use existing migration networks and routes to transport terrorists (e.g., in the form of sleeper cells) to foreign countries at little cost, making subsequent terrorist activities by these militants more likely. Likewise, foreign terrorist organizations could potentially draw on existing migrant communities in destination countries, known as diasporas.

Diasporas can be viewed as networks that provide their members with social connections, provide mutual emotional and social support, and strengthen a common identity. Terrorist organizations connected to these diasporas (for example, through shared religious or ethnic affiliation) may use these pre-existing networks for radicalization, recruitment, funding, intelligence gathering, and safe haven purposes. This should reduce the operating costs of terrorist organizations and thus make terrorism – ceteris paribus – more likely.

Secondly, it is these diaspora and migrant communities that may also be subject to discrimination in destination countries, for example in

the form of religious intolerance or exclusion from the labor market or political representation. Discrimination is a powerful predictor of terrorism. This makes terrorism a more attractive option by reducing its opportunity costs, for example because opportunities for nonviolent economic or political participation are limited. Therefore, as migration leads to the growth of diasporas, it can also lead to increased grievances (due to discrimination), which can fuel terrorist violence by migrants.

Terrorism and extremism continue to pose a serious threat to public safety in the European Union (EU). In this context, Europol's annual Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) is an important part of Europol's efforts to combat terrorism and extremism and provides an overview of the phenomenon of terrorism in the EU in a given year. Counter-terrorism is a top priority for the EU and Europol, which means that TE-SAT is one of the most important elements of Europol's strategic analysis. It offers law enforcement officials, policymakers and the general public facts and figures about terrorism in the EU, and identifies evolving trends in this area of crime based on information that Member States provide to Europol [7].

Migrants may not only be perpetrators of terrorism; they can also become its victims. Indigenous populations may react to (increased) immigration with fear and hostility. For example, migrants may be perceived as competitors in the labor market, a burden on domestic welfare systems, or a threat to local cultural identity. Applying a rational choice model of terrorism, an influx of migrants may make anti-immigrant terrorism more likely because:

1) there is a wider range of potential targets (which reduces the costs of violence against immigrants);

2) immigration can reduce the opportunity costs of violence against immigrants for local residents of the host country (for example, because competition in the labor market displaces part of the native population).

Migrants and refugees can also become scapegoats if they can be associated (for example, by religion or ethnicity) with external terrorist threats relevant to the indigenous population of the host country. Through these pathways, terrorism against non-natives may become more likely as immigration increases. This should especially apply to right-wing terrorism, which is usually fueled by rabid nationalism and xenophobia.

Member States' primary concern is jihadist terrorism and the closely related phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to and from conflict zones. Recent attacks in the EU demonstrate the intent and ability of jihadist terrorists to inflict mass casualties on urban populations in an attempt to cause well-publicized terror. Carefully orchestrated attacks continue to demonstrate the heightened threat to the EU from an

extremist minority operationally based in the Middle East, combined with a network of people born and raised in the EU, often radicalized in a short period of time, who have proven effective, willing and able to act as intermediaries and active accomplices of terrorism.

EU member states reported a total of 57 completed, failed and thwarted terrorist attacks in 2020. The UK reported 62 terrorist incidents and Switzerland reported two probable jihadist terrorist attacks. The number of terrorist attacks in EU Member States in 2020 is comparable to 2019 (119, of which 64 in the UK), but decreased compared to 2018 (129, of which 60 in the UK) [8]. In total, 21 people died as a result of terrorist attacks in the EU in 2020. Three people died in the UK and one in Switzerland. With the exception of the targeted killing of a schoolteacher in France, the fatal victims appear to have been selected at random and to represent populations identified as enemies for ideological reasons [8].

In 2020, three EU member states (Austria, France and Germany) suffered 10 jihadist attacks. As a result of the completed terrorist attacks in the EU, 12 people were killed and more than 47 were injured. Four jihadist plots were successfully foiled in Belgium, France and Germany. EU Member States assessed that jihadist terrorism remains the biggest terrorist threat in the EU. Switzerland has suffered two attacks in which jihadist motives played a role. This means that the number of completed jihadist attacks in Europe (EU, Switzerland and UK) in 2020 was 15, more than double the number in 2019 in the EU (including UK). In contrast, the number of thwarted jihadist attacks and terrorist plots in the EU and UK fell from 14 in 2019 to six in 2020 [8].

The most common type of jihad-inspired attacks in the EU, Switzerland and the UK were attacks in public places targeting civilians. The deaths were the result of one gun attack and five of six separate knife attacks in the EU. Additionally, arson and vehicles have been used as weapons in jihadist attacks in the EU, resulting in damage to private property and numerous injuries [7]. All EU jihadist attackers were men aged between 18 and 33. One of the probable terrorist attacks in Switzerland was carried out by a woman. The family background or place of birth of offenders, including those with EU citizenship, varied significantly. Four out of ten completed jihadist attacks were carried out by persons with EU citizenship. The perpetrators of five attacks arrived in the EU as asylum seekers or illegal migrants; in four cases they had entered the EU several years before the attack. One offender entered the EU from Tunisia via Italy about a month before the attack in Nice, France. All completed jihadist attacks were carried out by individuals acting alone, and at least three of the foiled plots involved multiple suspects [8].

Lone actors or small groups can carry out terrorist attacks as a result of online or offline incitement. Several suspects arrested in 2020 had online contacts with followers of terrorist groups outside the EU. In addition, it has been observed that jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe have a motivating effect on other potential terrorists. For example, on April 4, 2020, a 33-year-old Sudanese refugee stabbed two people to death and wounded five others in Romans-sur-Isère (Drôme, France). The gunman first went to a tobacco shop and stabbed the owner and his wife, then to a butcher shop, where he grabbed a knife and attacked people waiting outside the bakery, killing two people before being arrested. He entered France in 2016 and was reportedly unknown to French police and intelligence agencies. Documents were found at his home, probably handwritten by the attacker, in which he described France as a country of "unbelief." On August 18, 2020, a 30-year-old Iraqi asylum seeker caused multiple car crashes and injured six people on a highway in Berlin, Germany. The criminal was arrested. No terrorist organization claimed responsibility for the attack. The attacker's statements after his arrest suggested a religious motivation. There were also signs of psychological instability [8].

The most common type of jihadist attacks in the EU, Switzerland and the UK were attacks in public places targeting civilians. There was one gun attack and six separate knife attacks in the EU in 2020. In addition, arson and vehicles were used. All the jihadist attackers in the EU and UK were men aged between 18 and 33. One of the probable terrorist attacks in Switzerland was carried out by a woman. The family background or place of birth of offenders, including those with EU citizenship, varied significantly and some were from non-EU countries. Five out of ten completed jihadist terrorist attacks were carried out by people who entered the EU as asylum seekers or illegal migrants; in four cases they had entered the EU several years before the attack. Some of them seem to have become radicalized in Europe. One offender entered the EU from Tunisia via Italy about a month before the attack in Nice, France. In addition, the man who killed the French school teacher entered the EU as a boy with his parents, who were granted refugee status. At least five jihadist incidents in Austria, Germany and the UK involved attackers who were released, either convicted or imprisoned at the time of the attack [8].

The Netherlands has investigated suspected terrorists who returned not only from Syria, but also from Yemen and Somalia. They also indicted a number of refugees on suspicion of being military commanders of a terrorist organization. Other suspects are accused of inciting violence and attacks abroad. It is also noteworthy that the Netherlands is expecting numerous returnees from Syria; There are still

more than 100 Dutch jihadist travelers in Syria and Iraq who may return. The Netherlands assesses that travelers held in detention/reception camps in northeast Syria also pose a security risk and may join terrorist groups if released or escape. They can also return to the Netherlands secretly. Currently, about 15 people with ties to the Netherlands are detained in Syria. Several escape attempts were made by people detained in the area, but at the time of writing there were no reports that Dutch citizens were involved [9].

Europol is supporting Italy, Greece and Cyprus by deploying short-term national experts (visiting officers) to hot spots in the eastern Aegean islands, southern Italy and Cyprus. Deploying visiting officers to hotspots helps detect returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and the infiltration of foreign members of terrorist organizations and other criminals into EU territory. Although there is no concrete evidence that terrorist travelers are systematically exploiting refugee flows to enter Europe undetected, some terrorists have entered the EU under the guise of refugees, as in the case of the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015 to increase security checks on migrants entering the EU. Checks are carried out against all Europol databases and the relevant EU Member States are informed of the results [7].

The annual report on the terrorist situation and trends in the EU highlighted terrorist and criminal acts committed by refugees and asylum seekers. According to this report, there was information that part of the 2020 terrorist attacks were organized by refugees who arrived in Europe in 2012. The process of accepting refugees is complex. Groups of people fighting for their lives, fleeing war and conflict in their countries, are leaving their homes, their families and their homelands. For refugees, this is a huge psychological burden: changing the country of residence, fighting for life, waiting for the end of a war that does not know whether there will be an end, a change of environment, culture of behavior, acclimatization and adaptation.

People under enormous psychological stress are targets for conflict instigators and terrorists because such people are easy to manipulate and persuade. Often it is young refugees under psychological pressure who become victims of the instigators of the conflict. It is also important not to forget about people who, being terrorists, can easily hide behind refugees, live in camps, in pockets of people with post-war trauma, and recruit them for various criminal acts. Cyberterrorism has not yet been abolished, but we live in the age of information technology, which develops from year to year. Thus, it is important to note that refugees pose a threat to regional security if they are organized criminal activities by "professional" people.

Thus, it can be concluded that the concerns of EU governments regarding the reception of refugees may not be unfounded. The increase in the number of refugees is indeed marked by an increase in the level of crime, extremism and terrorism. At the same time, there is an increase in xenophobic sentiments among the local population, which also, in turn, leads to an increase in right-wing extremism.

4.3 Prospects for the development of the European Union refugee policy

EU countries with a colonial past accept a large number of legal and illegal migrants. Some migrants from former colonies are familiar with the language and culture of their former metropolises and quickly adapt to their new environment, while others feel vulnerable and disadvantaged because of their colonial past. This, of course, has an impact on the migration flows of the recipient state. In addition, in the European Union there are many jobs that do not require special education. As a rule, these jobs are occupied by immigrants who agree to work for the wages offered, which are unacceptable to the local population, which in turn creates good conditions for the further development of economic migration. In these conditions, tightened migration control measures are seen as quite contradictory, so the most promising mechanism for regulating migration flows is cooperation with sending countries.

Taking into account the constantly growing number of people wishing to enter developed European countries, which gives rise to growing social inequality, growing unemployment, etc., the EU is striving to develop restrictive mechanisms for monitoring and managing migration processes and introducing strict immigration regimes. This can already be observed in the strengthening of border controls, the establishment and introduction of additional measures to combat illegal migration, as well as restrictions on the permission of foreign citizens to various social services, including employment and medical care. Currently, one can observe greater selectivity in issuing permits for entry and residence, which would primarily meet the interests of the receiving party. Each national government develops its own requirements for immigrants.

EU member countries have readmission and partnership agreements with sending states - Readmission Agreements, Mobility Partnerships [10], Amsterdam Treaty [11], etc. These agreements can be considered as an effective tool for regulating the processes of returning illegal migrants to their homeland or to other safe third countries. In

addition, these agreements allow EU member states to conclude additional readmission agreements with third countries. All these agreements significantly strengthen international law, under which states are obliged to recognize their citizens. These agreements also regulate the responsibilities of EU member states. In particular, receiving states are required to either return illegal migrants to their home countries or provide them with some legal status. These measures made it possible to avoid legal uncertainty for illegal migrants and refugees. In turn, these measures imply a ban on entry into EU countries, reducing the need to detain and expel migrants.

The Mobile Partnership Agreement [10] is today one of the most promising tools for managing migration flows. Since 2007, this agreement has been signed by a number of states, such as Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Cape Verde. The main point of the mobile partnership is to obtain easier legal access to the European Union for citizens of their country in exchange for guarantees of assistance in controlling illegal migration flows. However, the mobile partnership agreement is systematically criticized by governmental and non-governmental organizations, since on a practical level the procedure for developing simplified access to the territory of the European Union becomes more complicated. The main goals of the agreement are to prevent illegal migration, improve border control, and simplify the procedure for obtaining short-term visas. At the same time, among the shortcomings, insufficient attention is paid to economic migration, mutual recognition of diplomas and qualifications, the rights of migrants and refugees, and problems of family reunification. Thus, it can be noted that the Mobile Partnership agreement focuses on measures to control illegal migration flows. As a concept, it represents a cooperative/collaborative method of addressing the issue of migration management in the European Union. Taken together with other agreements, this is a kind of attempt to create a supranational structure for managing international migration.

The dominance of national sovereignties remains a difficult problem in developing mechanisms for monitoring and managing migration flows in the European Union. This dominance hinders the development and implementation of a supranational system of migration policy. Despite the fact that the European Union has a mandate to make various proposals regulating immigration policy, the advantage of national methods and instruments for regulating migration, combined with the ardent resistance of European Union member states to harmonize migration policies, significantly slows down work in this direction. The migration crisis of 2015 clearly demonstrated that European countries are unable to agree among themselves on joint and comprehensive

migration management [12]. Some EU countries accepted migrants without restrictions, while others did their best to prevent this. For example, A. Merkel decided to accept 800,000 Syrian refugee migrants and thus refused the Dublin regulation [13]. However, the number of migrants quickly increased, and therefore Hungary, Austria, and the Netherlands decided to close their borders. A number of countries, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden and Croatia, limited access, accepting only those who could prove that they came from countries where fighting or political conflicts are ongoing (for example, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan).

It should be noted that differences between national migration policies persist to this day. Especially in the field of regulation and legalization of the reception, movement and expulsion of refugees. Thus, the countries of Western Europe adhere to "zero" immigration, while the countries of Southern Europe, on the contrary, pursue a policy of economic migration and pursue a relatively soft migration policy, providing more opportunities for migrants. Thus, Spanish migration legislation does not criminalize the definition of illegal immigration. According to Spanish law, an illegal immigrant is a citizen of a foreign country who is not a resident of the Kingdom of Spain. Thus, some migrants who crossed the border legally do not leave the country after the deadline expires and become illegal immigrants. In this case, the punishment is only an administrative fine. And in Germany there is a criminal penalty for this. It should be noted that Germany and the Netherlands regularly criticize Spain for its migration regularization programs. However, many countries in Western Europe are faced with the problem of having to legalize asylum applicants who have completed the procedure but have not received refugee status. Accordingly, this category of applicants continues to reside in the territory of the host country, but without the appropriate documents [14, p.54-55].

The large differences in national legislation and migration systems of EU member states have led to legal and practical contradictions, which in turn has led to a lack of effective management of immigration processes. Absolutely every European state faces different migration situations, adopting its own unique political management strategies. All this leads to the fact that a compromise between them is difficult to achieve.

This situation has led to the fact that the actions of the European Union to control issues related to immigration policy have contributed to the formation of restrictive methods and instruments of a common immigration policy. The Amsterdam Treaty that entered into force only confirmed the negative trajectory of migration policy: the creation of general principles of immigration security policy in Europe based on

negative regulatory experience. EU documents place emphasis on migrants' compliance with certain restrictive conditions. Even now, the focus in the areas of freedom, security and law is on developing repressive legislation that controls illegal immigration flows rather than managing and regulating legal ones. As a result, the problems of national migration policy priorities correlate with issues of ambivalent attitude towards immigrants. All this leads to a constant increase in funding for security agencies, the introduction of surveillance equipment, increased maritime control, etc.

As for migrant labor, it is generally accepted that it is necessary as a complement to the European labor market, since it primarily compensates for the shortage of unskilled workers. However, at the same time, a large influx of migrants creates competition in the labor market, thereby contributing to the dumping of cash payments and increasing tension in the social sphere. This is also one of the factors why national governments develop restrictive immigration policies.

The European Union's measures to combat illegal immigration exclude the need to manage the underlying causes of migration, and often improve their protection, which of course leads to contradictions between European migration policy and human rights policy.

Attempts by the European Union to intensify internal security through the tools and methods of securitizing migration have ultimately led to a reduction in immigrants' chances of legal entry, access to employment, and public services. In our opinion, restricting legal migration, on the contrary, stimulates the growth of illegal immigration.

Thus, the main problems of national and supranational political management of immigration flows in the European Union are:

1. Difficulties in effectively managing migration due to Europe's colonial past;

2. Ineffective EU policy to develop cooperation in the field of managing migration processes together with the sending country;

3. The dominance of national structures for managing immigration policy, which in turn does not allow the formation of common approaches at the level of the European Union;

4. Excessive securitization and ambivalent attitudes towards immigrants.

In our opinion, the migration crisis and the growing influx of illegal immigrants have pushed the European bureaucracy towards more active centralization of the European Union, however, contradictions and disagreements between its members can provoke a process of disintegration and the possible exit of individual states from the eurozone. Migration problems are difficult to solve at the national level. They require the combined efforts of all EU members, the use of all

mechanisms to overcome the consequences of the crisis and the development of a comprehensive migration policy.

The migration crisis has shown that the EU's common European migration policy exists, but does not work. Migration issues remain largely the prerogative of national governments, and the positions and approaches of EU countries to the reception of migrants and refugees vary significantly.

As a result of the analysis of the fundamentals of migration policy and the factors that caused the EU migration crisis, several scenarios for the further development of the situation can be imagined.

The first scenario, called "The End of Europe," assumes the continuation of the policy of multiculturalism in the EU countries. Obviously, given the instability in the Middle East and the special position of Turkey, the continuation of such a policy will indirectly lead to the collapse of the EU (Figure 1).

Scenario 1 "The End of Europe"		
Necessary conditions	**Possible consequences**	
	positive	negative
1) implementation of migration policy based on multiculturalism; 2) instability in the Middle East; 3) lack of solidarity between EU member states; 4) Turkey's unconstructive position (not containing refugees); 5) lack of support from other countries	–	a) the threat of the spread of terrorism; b) identity crisis c) growing social tension and far-right (neo-Nazi) sentiments d) increase in crimee) collapse of the EU

Figure 1 – Scenario 1 "End of Europe"

The second scenario involves the transformation of the policy of "multiculturalism" (Figure 2)

Scenario 2 "Transformation of multiculturalism"		
Necessary conditions	**Possible consequences**	
	positive	negative
1) introduction of entry quotas; 2) reduction of social guarantees; 3) equal participation of all EU members in finding a solution to the problem; 4) stability in the Middle East; 5) participation of other countries (USA); 6) people of different cultures have a common goal - caring for the country as a common home.	a) the end of the migration crisis; b) successful integration of migrants into the culture of the host country; c) limiting the number of migrants; d) growth of economic opportunities by reducing the costs of migrants; e) friendly attitude on the part of the indigenous population; f) optimal use of new labor resources represented by migrants; g) reduction of material inequality.	a) the threat of increased illegal immigration and the possible infiltration of terrorists into the EU; b) the possible lack of a common civic identity among migrants; c) possible pressure on communities of different cultures

Figure 2 – Scenario 2 "Transformation of multiculturalism"

The third scenario assumes that EU countries refuse to apply the concept of "multiculturalism" (Figure 3).

Scenario 3 "Rejection of the concept of multiculturalism"		
Necessary conditions	**Possible consequences**	
	positive	negative
1) change of ruling parties; 2) closing borders; 3) refusal to accept "new" migrants; 4) expulsion of refugees (deportation); 5) non-recognition of foreign cultural communities; 6) insecurity of migrants by the state; 7) reduction of social security costs.	a) increasing the budget by reducing migrants and social security costs; b) protecting the interests of its own citizens.	a) discrimination and subsequent social inequality; b) increase in illegal migration; c) open confrontation between the indigenous population and migrants, followed by an increase in crime; d) terrorism; e) demographic decline; f) labor shortage; g) "victory" of migrant or indigenous European culture

Figure 3 – Scenario 3 "Rejection of the concept of multiculturalism"

It is obvious that abandoning the concept of "multiculturalism" has more negative consequences, primarily associated with discrimination and social inequality, as well as an increase in illegal migration and crime.

The most likely, realistic scenario for the development of the EU migration system is Scenario 2, which involves the transformation of the concept of "multiculturalism". This is also the most optimistic scenario, which involves the development of a joint solution to the migration crisis acceptable to the majority of EU member states and the construction of a common migration policy. EU countries will be able to join forces to find the most painless strategy for them to contain or limit migration flows in general, and refugee flows in particular.

The migration crisis, which began and flared up in 2015-2016, does not actually subside and continues to remain relevant for the EU countries, at times gaining momentum, and is not far from its logical conclusion. Evidence of this is the identified trends in the development of migration processes in the 21st century with the continuing model of migration policy, which continues to promote entry into EU countries exclusively through legal means, aimed at simplifying the rules and procedures governing the entry and duration of stay of migrants and refugees in the territory of host countries and departure, as well as the integration of visiting foreigners. At the same time, the national security course, which is the most important point in the overall development trends of the EU, focuses on existing challenges and threats to internal security.

Considering the current migration situation and the prospects for the development of the migration crisis that began in 2015, we came to three possible scenarios for the development of migration policy, the most likely of which is the possible transformation of the concept of multiculturalism, which today is fundamental in EU migration policy. This scenario assumes stabilization throughout the Middle East, the introduction of an entry quota, as well as the joining of efforts and equal participation of EU member states in finding an optimal solution, and most importantly, a common solution to the problem under consideration and a reduction in social guarantees. Ultimately, this could lead to the end of the decades-long migration crisis, as well as the successful integration of migrants into the culture of host countries. However, since the presented development scenario is not exclusively positive, there are risks of threats associated with the growth of illegal migration and the possible penetration of terrorists, as well as pressure on communities of other cultures.

At the same time, today each EU country is still focused on solving only its own migration problems occurring within the country. The EU

risks its own existence and socio-political stability due to its inability to cope with the migration crisis on time and independently. At the same time, the main mistake may be following the whims of Turkey, which positions itself as the only savior of Europe from the current situation.

Analysis of the migration crisis and approaches to its resolution allows us to conclude that the EU is capable of ending the migration crisis on its own, provided that all participating countries unite their efforts and show solidarity in finding ways to solve the crisis by developing a unified system. The EU also needs to develop mechanisms aimed at the uniform resettlement of forced migrants and the organization of the work of certain structures for the distribution of refugees. The unity of EU countries can help to jointly overcome the migration crisis with minimal losses for them and confirm the authority of the integration association and its viability in the international arena.

Thus, migration policy in EU countries is constantly changing and adapting to new conditions. In general, all European states proceed from the principles of selective integration and assimilation strategies, and their migration policies are characterized by two trends:

1) transition from restrictive to selective policies in the selection of migrants, in particular, the point system is used to attract qualified migrants;

2) transition from regulating migration flows to active policies, including the conclusion of bilateral agreements between European and African countries on cooperation in the fight against illegal migration.

Chapter 5. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN REGULATING MIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

5.1. The International Organization for Migration
5.2. The United Nation Refugee Agency
5.3. The International Labor Organization

5.1. The International Organization for Migration

International regulation of migration is carried out within the framework of bilateral agreements, as well as within the framework of the activities of international organizations. Today, a significant part of the international institutions and standards in the field of migration and labor have been created with the active participation of the United Nations (UN), International Labor Organization (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Health Organization (WHO) and other organizations. The leading role in regulating international migration belongs to the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The International Organization for Migration was founded in 1951 as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee on the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), as a result of the chaos and displacement of Western Europe after World War II [1]. The main prerequisite for its creation at that time was the need to regulate large flows of migrants in Europe as a consequence of the Second World War.

The organization is now faced not with the consequences of a war that has engulfed an entire continent or the world, but with large numbers of migrants from different countries changing their place of residence in search of better economic opportunities for themselves and their families. IOM works with governments, other international organizations and civil society groups to ensure the orderly movement of refugees and others in need of international migration assistance throughout the world.

The Provisional Committee was tasked with helping European governments identify resettlement countries for the estimated 11 million people displaced by the war, and it organized transport for nearly a

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[1] https://www.iom.int/iom-history

million migrants in the 1950s. The Committee worked closely with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to address issues related to migration. In 1989 it was transformed into the International Organization for Migration.

The sequence of name changes from PICMME to the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) in 1952, from the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICM) in 1980 to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 1989 reflects the organization's transition over half a century from a local regional agency to an international organization.

While IOM's history reflects man-made and natural disasters over the past half century - Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Chile 1973, Vietnam Boatmen 1975, Kuwait 1990, Kosovo and Timor 1999, Asian Tsunami and the 2004-2005 Pakistan earthquake - her credo that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society gradually gained international recognition.

From its beginnings as an operational logistics agency, it has expanded its scope to become a leading international agency working with governments and civil society to advance understanding of migration issues, promote social and economic development through migration, and protect human dignity and well-being. belonging to migrants.

The broader range of activities was accompanied by rapid expansion from a relatively small agency to one with an annual operating budget of approximately US$3 billion and more than 19,500 employees operating in 171 countries. Currently, the IOM includes 175 member states and another 8 states with observer status.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration should benefit both migrants and the receiving society. IOM, together with its partners, carries out activities aimed at providing assistance in solving operational problems in the field of migration; explaining problems related to migration; supporting social and economic development through migration; full promotion of genuine respect for the human dignity of migrants and concern for their well-being.

IOM supports migrants around the world by developing effective responses to changing migration dynamics and, as such, is a key source of advice on migration policy and practice. The organization works in emergency situations, developing the resilience of all people on the move, and especially those in situations of vulnerability, and building the capacity of governments to manage all forms and impacts of mobility.

The main goals of IOM are:

Figure 1 - Main goals of the International Organization for Migration

The organization is guided by the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the protection of human rights for all. Respect for the rights, dignity and well-being of migrants remains paramount.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) serves the needs of approximately 281 million migrants worldwide, in addition to the countless hundreds of thousands of people who cross borders illegally each year, including those who may have been trafficked. In addition, Member States called on IOM to support a significant portion of the estimated 71.1 million internally displaced people worldwide (IDMC, GRID 2023)[1].

The main areas of activity of the International Organization for Migration are the following areas:

Table 1 – Areas of IOM activity

Direction	Description
MIGRATION MANAGEMENT	IOM is working to develop policy guidance in this area; formulation of global strategies; standard setting and quality control; and knowledge management related to "core"

[1] https://www.iom.int/iom-results-and-annual-reports

	migration sectors, including labor and facilitated migration, migration and development, anti-trafficking, assisted voluntary return, migrant health, assistance to vulnerable migrants, immigration and border management and general capacity building in migration management.
	In addition, through the Development Fund, IOM supports interregional and global projects. This includes technical oversight of project review and approval by subject matter experts, as well as operational partnerships with relevant government, multilateral and private industry partners in coordination with the Department of International Cooperation and Partnerships.
CRISIS RESPONSE	Conflict, armed violence, disasters, epidemics, pandemics and other crises force millions of people from their homes and communities, sometimes for years or even decades. Currently, more than 82 million people live in displacement within and across borders, and natural disasters displace an average of about 25 million people each year. Economic recession, political instability and other factors are also causing massive population movements.
	As the lead UN agency working on migration, IOM is committed to saving lives and helping communities escape danger. Protect and assist those who have been displaced or stranded by the crisis, and support the recovery of people and their communities. We work to mitigate the pressures that force people from their homes, help build resilience, and focus on disaster risk reduction so that movement and migration can become a choice.
	IOM is one of the world's largest humanitarian organizations and one of the few international organizations directly implementing humanitarian, development and peace programs, ensuring comprehensive, holistic and inclusive responses at all stages of crises. IOM's efforts to address the challenges of the mobility crisis are reflected in the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF)[1].
	Through MCOF, IOM uniquely applies its expertise in migration and mobility to save lives and address the widespread and far-reaching impacts of crisis-related displacement or changing migration patterns on individuals and communities. IOM uses MCOF to ensure that the perspectives of affected people and the impact of crises on displaced people, migrants and communities are consistently taken into account.
THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	The International Organization for Migration (IOM) maintains and coordinates relations with its member states, intergovernmental organizations, civil society and the media. He also provides leadership and support in relationships with

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[1] MCOF is a practical, operational and institution-wide tool to improve and systematize how the organization supports its member states and partners to better prepare for and respond to migration crises

	government, multilateral and private sector donors.
	IOM leads and coordinates the forum's activities, including the International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), support for global and regional consultative processes and preparations for the annual governing body meetings.
	The organization also monitors developments in national and international migration policies and promotes awareness and understanding of international migration law. It ensures the broad and consistent development and dissemination of IOM's institutional positions on key issues and trends in international migration policy, in consultation with organizational units. He also informs IOM staff on strategic planning and program development, and coordinates, promotes, and disseminates new research, especially regarding emerging issues. These functions include contributing to international migration discourse, monitoring international meetings, setting priorities and ensuring adequate representation.
Note: source https://www.iom.int/our-work	

The International Organization for Migration has defined the IOM Strategic Plan (2024–2028), drawn up at the request of the Director-General[1] at the beginning of her term. It sets out how the Organization will support its Member States to seize the opportunities and address the challenges of migration, while supporting the most vulnerable people.

The Strategic Plan invites IOM's many partners to work with the Organization to achieve three strategic goals[2]:

Figure 2 - Goals of the IOM Strategic Plan for 2024–2028

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[1] The Director General of IOM is Amy Pope, who was elected on 05/15/2023 at the 6th Session of the IOM Council by IOM member states

[2] IOM STRATEGIC PLAN 2024 –2028 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/pub2023-159-r-iom-strategic-plan.pdf#DefiningMoment

IOM, together with its international partners, implements the following programs to assist the governments and civil society of many countries:

— migration for humanitarian purposes (providing assistance to people affected by conflicts and their consequences, refugees and repatriates, displaced persons, both within their own country and abroad, persons wishing to reunite with their family);

— migration for development purposes (ensuring the influx of qualified labor into states, taking into account the priorities of their development, the needs and interests of the local population in the receiving countries);

— technical cooperation programs (providing advisory services to governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in the field of migration, developing the necessary comprehensive measures to solve migration problems in a changing international environment, as well as strengthening the capacity of states by training personnel of services responsible for regulating migration and providing them with technical support);

— carries out research and analysis of information (conducting regional and international seminars and conferences to discuss migration problems, researching the causes and consequences of migration processes, the situation and needs of migrants, developing and conducting information campaigns).

The International Organization for Migration began its activities in Kazakhstan on December 2, 2002.

As the Country Office with Coordinating Functions for Central Asia, the IOM mission in Kazakhstan helps address specific subregional migration issues and emerging trends by setting priorities for project development and resource mobilization, and by stimulating, guiding and supporting project development in country offices in the context of subregional strategies, policies and consultative processes.

Kazakhstan became a member state of IOM on December 2, 2002. As the country office with coordination responsibilities for Central Asia, the IOM mission in Kazakhstan helps address specific sub-regional migration issues and emerging trends in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, identifying priorities for project development and resource mobilization, and stimulating, guiding and supporting developing projects in country offices in the context of subregional strategies, policies and consultative processes.

IOM Strategy in Central Asia

IOM's strategic vision in Central Asia is to maximize the potential of migration to promote development and economic growth in Central Asia. To achieve this vision and fulfill IOM's mandate to promote humane and orderly migration management, the following objectives have been identified:

– Improve understanding of migration among governments, communities and employers.

– Help create effective migration management systems and solve problems associated with illegal migration.

– Promoting and protecting the rights of migrants.

– Contribute to poverty reduction in Central Asia among migrants, local communities and host communities.

– Promote an enabling environment for decent work, equal employment opportunities and best practices.

– Support community stabilization and migrant integration in conflict-prone areas.

– Provide assistance to people on the move.

– Addressing multiple issues related to human trafficking, including preventing trafficking and protecting victims.

Critical migration issues in the region

Central Asia faces several critical challenges in migration management. These issues reflect the economic, political and social tensions that exist throughout the region. The most important migration problems in Central Asia include:

– Insufficient interstate dialogue on migration issues and difficulties in harmonizing international, regional and national migration processes.

– Inadequate national and regional migration policies and undeveloped legislative framework.

– Poor data collection, management and sharing, resulting in inadequate understanding of the actual extent of migration and irregular migration.

– Underdeveloped capacity to address migration issues. Greater understanding of migration issues by government agencies is needed, as well as capacity building to address migration and border management issues.

– Inadequate legal and social framework to protect migrants, especially their human rights.

– Widespread labor and sexual exploitation of migrants.

– Lack of optimization of remittances: in an environment where a significant portion of the GDP of many Central Asian countries comes

from migrants working abroad. Governments lack the capacity to mainstream migration into the development agenda.

– Political uncertainty and disaster-prone geography that characterize Central Asia require stabilization of communities and reduction of disaster risk.

Integrated Approach in Central Asia

The five countries of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - are closely linked in terms of history and culture. Therefore, migration issues in these countries are also interconnected and have much in common. In an effort to address these challenges, as well as support economic and political cooperation among the five Central Asian countries, IOM recently adopted a territorial approach to the five Central Asian countries, with a coordination office in Astana, Kazakhstan.

To ensure coherence and long-term sustainable solutions, IOM has introduced a unified management approach across Central Asia. This approach has enabled IOM to improve the capacity of individual missions in terms of fundraising, responsiveness, accountability, transparency and professionalism. He also helps the Coordination Office manage and monitor programs, allowing IOM to increase its capacity in Central Asia while reducing operating costs.

In Central Asia, IOM's integrated approach has created a strong competitive advantage. This advantage is due to three factors. First, IOM's unified management system increases its capacity in the region while reducing operational costs, allowing for efficient management and helping to ensure maximum impact. Secondly, IOM places great emphasis on teamwork. IOM missions in Central Asia not only cooperate closely with each other within the framework of regional projects, but also closely interact with IOM missions outside the immediate cluster area, especially with the Russian Federation. Finally, IOM's long-standing presence in the region has allowed it to accumulate extensive experience. IOM has extensive knowledge of the programmatic, geopolitical, cultural and socio-economic dynamics of Central Asia.

IOM's regional programs promote improved coordination and coherence on cross-border issues and leverage the competitive advantages of IOM's field presence in all five Central Asian countries. In addition, IOM's regional programs allow it to engage in close, coordinated collaboration with various governments and civil society organizations. Such coordination led to the achievement of excellent results.

Thus, the direct activities of the IOM cover such areas of work as the study of global causes and factors influencing migrants, countries of

transit and destination. Much attention is paid to humanitarian challenges caused by protracted conflicts and environmental factors, in the context of their current and potential impact on population mobility and its impact on the environment. The relationship between population movements and climate change on the one hand, and migration on the other, is often complicated by a range of other factors, such as population growth, poverty, urbanization, human security and conflict.

5.2 The United Nations Refugee Agency

The UN refugee agency, formally known as the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is a global organization dedicated to saving lives, protecting rights and building a better future for people forced to flee their homes due to conflict and persecution.

Following the collapse of the League of Nations and the formation of the United Nations, the international community became acutely aware of the refugee crisis following the end of World War II. In 1947, the UN established the International Refugee Organization (IRO). IRO was the first international agency to comprehensively address all aspects of refugee life. Before that was the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Administration, which was created in 1944 to address the millions of people displaced throughout Europe by World War II.

The IRO fell out of favor in the late 1940s, but the UN agreed that a body was needed to oversee global refugee problems. Despite many heated debates in the General Assembly, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly by UN General Assembly Resolution 319 (IV) of December 1949. However, the organization was only to operate for 3 years, starting in January 1951, due to disagreement among many UN member states over the implications of creating a permanent body.

UNHCR's mandate was originally set out in its statute, annexed to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 428(V) of 1950. This mandate was subsequently expanded by numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). According to UNHCR, "a mandate is necessary to ensure, on a non-political and humanitarian basis, the international protection of refugees and to find permanent solutions for them."

Soon after the signing of the Refugee Convention in 1951, it became clear that refugees were not limited to Europe. In 1956, UNHCR was involved in coordinating the response to the Hungarian uprising. Just a

year later, UNHCR was tasked with dealing with Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, as well as responding to Algerian refugees who fled to Morocco and Tunisia after the Algerian War of Independence. These responses marked the beginning of a broader global mandate for refugee protection and humanitarian assistance.

During the 1960s, UNHCR was actively involved in resolving the refugee crises that arose as a result of the decolonization process in Africa. in the 1960s caused massive movements of refugees in Africa, creating a massive problem that would transform UNHCR; Unlike refugee crises in Europe, there were no long-term solutions in Africa, and many refugees who fled one country found instability only in their new country of refuge. By the end of the decade, two-thirds of UNHCR's budget was focused on operations in Africa, and within just one decade the organization's focus had shifted from an almost exclusive focus on Europe.

In 1967, the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was ratified to remove the geographical and temporal restrictions of UNHCR under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Because the Convention was limited to the post-World War II refugee crisis in Europe, the protocol was drawn up to deal with "new refugee situations that have arisen since the adoption of the instrument and relevant refugees who may therefore not be subject to the Convention."

Over the next two decades, UNHCR assisted in resolving migration crises in Asia and Latin America.

In the 1970s, UNHCR's refugee operations continued to spread throughout the world, and mass migration of East Pakistanis to India occurred shortly before Bangladesh's independence. Adding to the troubles in Asia was the Vietnam War, which saw millions of people flee the war-torn country.

In the 1980s, UNHCR faced new challenges: many Member States were unwilling to resettle refugees due to the sharp increase in refugee numbers in the 1970s. often these refugees fled not from wars between states, but from interethnic conflicts in the newly independent states. Targeting civilians as a military strategy led to population displacement in many countries, so even "minor" conflicts could result in large numbers of refugees.

Whether in Asia, Central America or Africa, these conflicts, fueled by superpower rivalry and exacerbated by socio-economic problems in the countries concerned, continue to be a major challenge for UNHCR. As a result, UNHCR has become more involved in assistance programs in refugee camps, often located in hostile environments.

The end of the last millennium was marked by a renewed migration crisis in Africa and, back to square one, a refugee crisis in Europe caused by the wars in the Balkans[1].

The end of the Cold War saw continued ethnic conflict and contributed significantly to refugee flight. In addition, instances of humanitarian intervention by multinational forces increased and the media began to play a greater role, especially in the lead-up to the NATO mission to Yugoslavia in 1999, while little attention was paid to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Rwandan genocide caused a massive refugee crisis, again highlighting the difficulties UNHCR faced in fulfilling its mandate, and UNHCR continued to fight against restrictive refugee policies in so-called "rich" countries[2].

UNHCR, the United Nations Refugee Agency, is a global organization tasked by UN Member States to provide protection support and sustainable solutions for internally displaced and stateless people. It is dedicated to saving lives, protecting rights and building a better future for people forced to flee their homes due to conflict and persecution.

Headquartered in Geneva, there are offices in many capitals and conflict spots around the world. About 89 percent of its staff works in the field. Today, more than 18,000 staff in 135 countries provide protection and assistance to approximately 59 million refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons. The bulk of the Office's staff is based in countries in Asia and Africa, which have the largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons. UN staff often have to work in difficult and dangerous conditions, as many of those in need of assistance are located in hard-to-reach places. The Office is headed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. On January 1, 2016, he became Filippo Grandi, former Commissioner General of UNRWA.

As of mid-2023, the top five countries of origin of refugees and people in need of international protection are Syria (6.5 million), Afghanistan (6.1 million), Ukraine (6 million), Venezuela (5.6 million) and South Sudan (2.2 million)[3].

In 1954, the High Commissioner for Refugees approved the annual Nansen Medal, now the Nansen Prize. The prize is awarded for achievements in the field of protecting the rights of refugees.

The UNHCR Nansen Prize for Refugee Protection recognizes individuals, groups and organizations that demonstrate exceptional commitment to the protection of refugees, displaced and stateless persons.

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[1] https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr

[2] *Gil Loescher.* The Cold War Origins of the UNHCR Under Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart// The UNHCR and World Politics. — Oxford University Press, 2001-05-24. — C. 50–76.

[3] https://www.un.org/ru/global-issues/refugees

The award was established in 1954 to honor the legacy of Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian scientist, polar explorer, diplomat and the first High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations.

The first Nansen Refugee Prize was awarded in 1954 to Eleanor Roosevelt, the first chairwoman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and first lady of the United States along with President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Since then, more than 60 individuals, organizations and groups have been honored for their exceptional work and service to people displaced from their homes.

Global Compact on Refugees

On 17 December 2018, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Global Compact for Refugees, a framework for more predictable and fair sharing of responsibility, recognizing that sustainable solutions to refugee situations cannot be achieved without international cooperation.

The treaty has four main objectives:
– relieve pressure on host countries,
– increase the self-sufficiency of refugees,
– expand access to solutions offered by third countries,
– maintain conditions in countries of origin for safe and dignified return.

The 2023 Global Refugee Forum, an event designed to support the implementation of the four goals and the world's largest international refugee conference, resulted in more than 1,600 commitments in support of refugees and their host communities, including 43 government-led multilateral commitments .

States and other participants announced about $2.2 billion in new financial commitments, and the private sector pledged about $250 million.

5.3. The International Labour Organization

The International Labor Organization came into existence in 1919 along with the League of Nations under the Treaty of Versailles. The creation of the ILO reflected the desire for social change after the First World War and the conviction that any reforms must be carried out on an international basis.

The organization played a role in key historical moments - the Great Depression, decolonization, the creation of Solidarity in Poland, the victory over apartheid in South Africa - and today in building an ethical and productive basis for a fair globalization.

The ILO Constitution was drafted in early 1919 by the Labor Commission chaired by Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the United States. It included representatives of nine countries: Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Japan, Poland, Great Britain and the USA[1].

As a result of this process, a unique tripartite organization was created, uniting representatives of governments, employers and workers in its executive bodies.

The driving forces behind the creation of the ILO were security, humanitarian, political and economic considerations. The founders of the ILO recognized the importance of social justice in ensuring peace against the backdrop of the exploitation of workers in the industrializing countries of the time. There was also a growing understanding of global economic interdependence and the need for cooperation to achieve similar working conditions in countries competing for markets.

Reflecting these ideas, the Preamble to the ILO Constitution reads[2]:

— Whereas, general and lasting peace can only be established if it is based on social justice;

— And although there are conditions of work which involve such injustice, deprivation and deprivation for large numbers of people as to cause such great unrest that the peace and harmony of the world are endangered; and improvement of these conditions is urgently needed;

— Whereas, the failure of any nation to accept humane conditions of labor is an obstacle to other nations who desire to improve conditions in their countries.

The areas of improvement listed in the preamble remain relevant today, including regulating working hours and labor supply, preventing unemployment and ensuring an adequate living wage, and social protection for workers, children, youth and women. The Preamble also recognizes a number of key principles, such as equal pay for work of equal value and freedom of association, and emphasizes, among other things, the importance of vocational education.

The ILO moved to Geneva in the summer of 1920, with the Frenchman Albert Thomas as its first director. In less than two years, nine international labor conventions and 10 recommendations have been adopted. These standards covered key issues including:

– opening hours,
– unemployment,
– maternity protection,
– night work for women,

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[1] https://www.ilo.org/ru/about-ilo/history-ilo
[2] https://www.unaids.org/ru/aboutunaids/unaidscosponsors/ilo

− minimum age and night work for young people.

After World War II, in the Declaration of Philadelphia, the ILO reaffirmed and expanded its core objectives. The Declaration anticipated the growing post-war desire for national independence and laid the foundation for large-scale technical cooperation with the developing world.

In 1946, the ILO became the first specialized agency of the newly formed United Nations.

Aims and objectives of the ILO[1]:

− Promotion of fundamental principles of labor law;

− Expanding opportunities for women and men to obtain decent employment;

− Increasing the coverage and effectiveness of social security;

− Strengthening tripartism (social dialogue between trade unions and employers with the participation of government representatives to develop and implement national policies in social, economic and other areas).

The ILO has a tripartite structure. Representatives of employers and workers have an equal voice in determining policies and programs, along with government representatives.

Managment structure:

— International Labor Conference. Convened annually; Adopts international labor standards and determines the general policies of the ILO. Each participating State has the right to send four delegates to the Conference: two from the government and one each from workers' and employers' representatives. These representatives have the right to speak and vote independently of each other;

— Administrative Council. Between annual sessions of the Conference, the activities of the ILO are governed by the Governing Body, which consists of 56 permanent members (28 government representatives, 14 workers' representatives and 14 employers' representatives) and 66 alternate members (28 government representatives, 19 workers' representatives and 19 employers' representatives);

— International Labor Office. It is the permanent secretariat of the ILO. Located in Geneva;

— General Director. Manages the work of the International Labor Office. Reports to the Administrative Council and is elected by it for a period of five years;

— Tripartite committees on major sectors of the economy, committees of experts on various issues.

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[1] Website of the International Labor Organization https://www.ilo.org/ru/kazakhstan

The main tasks of the ILO:

— development of coordinated policies and programs aimed at solving social and labor problems;

— adoption of international labor standards in the form of conventions and recommendations and monitoring their implementation;

— assistance to participating countries in solving social and labor problems;

— protection of human rights (to work, to freedom of association, to collective bargaining, from forced labor, discrimination, etc.);

— conducting research and publishing publications on social and labor issues.

The work of the ILO is based on the principle of tripartism - negotiations within the Organization are carried out between representatives of governments, trade union organizations and employers of member countries.

Since 1919, the organization has adopted 190 conventions and more than 200 recommendations on social and labor issues[1].

The highest body of the ILO, the International Labor Conference, convenes at least once a year. At the Conference, international standards in the social and labor field are considered and adopted, issues of global importance are discussed. The executive body of the ILO is the Administrative Council, which directs the work of the Organization in the period between sessions of the Conference and determines the procedure for implementing its decisions. The functions of the ILO secretariat are performed by the International Labor Office.

Kazakhstan has been a member of the ILO since 1993[2].

The ILO's activities in Kazakhstan are coordinated by the office of the National Coordinator.

In Kazakhstan, the ILO ensures that its key priorities and interests, policies and experiences are communicated to key stakeholders.

The ILO's mission in Kazakhstan is to have a strong, visible and active presence in the country to effectively facilitate and support social dialogue between governments, employers' and workers' organizations, and build partnerships with international institutions - with the aim of promoting decent work and social justice.

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[1] https://www.un.org/ru/property-cards-by-og-global-category/27320/12207

[2] About the activities of the International Labor Organization in the Republic of Kazakhstan
https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/enbek/press/article/details/8383?lang=ru

CONCLUSION

The study of the migration policy of the European Union and its institutional structure made it possible to identify internal disagreements within the EU related to the implementation of a common migration policy.

There is tension within the institutional mechanism due to conflicts of interest at the supranational and intergovernmental levels. Despite the fact that migration policy is an area of common competence, EU member states retain sovereign decision-making capabilities. Therefore, EU unity is weakening, especially in negotiations that require linking issues. Reluctance to unite sovereignty, different and divided attitudes towards migration among EU countries in domestic politics and competing narratives further deepen the gap.

On an issue like migration policy, the EU cannot be the normative, liberal force it is often described as. Normative considerations regarding morality and universal values are set aside in favor of EU countries' own interests. This realistic behavior is evident in the gap between migration rhetoric and harsh practice.

The link between migration and development is widely discussed in the scientific community, as well as in policy and negotiation settings. On the one hand, migrants contribute to the development of their country of origin through remittance flows or skills transfer. On the other hand, the EU tends to perceive the low level of development of donor countries as a cause of migration and therefore encourage their development in order to prevent migrants from entering the EU.

The EU takes advantage of the asymmetry in its relations with developing countries, imposing its interests and using coercion in exchange for financial development assistance. Although developing countries have some leverage in migration pacts, these relationships are still characterized by dependence rather than equality and can be understood as neo-colonialist. Consequently, any negotiations on migration agreements are not carried out on an equal and fair level.

Overall, the EU's involvement in the externalization of migration policies is an indicator of self-interested behavior. Externalization means controlling immigration into the EU beyond its borders and involving external actors through international agreements. Mobility partnerships are a means of externalization, as other states take on responsibility for readmitting migrants, strengthening border controls, or establishing

migration centers. Essentially, the aim is to prevent the unwanted entry of migrants, including asylum seekers, into EU territory.

Externalizing migration allows the EU to reduce its responsibilities and legal obligations to the detriment of the lives of migrants and asylum seekers. Externalization also exposes the discrepancy between the EU's rhetorical commitment to promoting norms and the realistic pursuit of its own interests. The question of whether the EU is responsible for human rights violations outside its territory associated with externalization creates a dilemma.

However, while establishing itself in world politics as a normative or even ethical power, the EU is unlikely to openly operate in a legal gray zone (adhering to legal uncertainty) and put human lives at risk in defending its interests. Otherwise, an open demonstration of protecting the national interests of EU member states while maintaining the rhetoric of ensuring and protecting human rights and democratic norms can be interpreted as conditional liberalism, exposing the realist side of the EU.

Thus, the "common" migration policy of the EU does not imply the existence of a single set of rules, identical for all countries, but represents only adherence to common guidelines, goals and principles based on subsidiarity. This is confirmed by the forms of legal acts - regulations and directives. The Regulation is a norm that is binding and directly applicable in all EU Member States. The Directive defines only the goal or results that EU Member States are obliged to achieve. At the same time, national authorities themselves choose specific methods and forms of solving the problem set out in the directive. It is worth noting that most EU legal acts in the field of migration are adopted in the form of directives.

Integration programs are a feature of EU migration policy. In 2004, the EU adopted common basic principles for the integration of migrants. Integration is defined as a two-way process involving both the host country and the arriving migrants. The state must provide migrants with the same access to education, health care and employment as its citizens. Migrants, for their part, must respect the order and laws of the host country, accept cultural and social norms, respect the values of the host country and the EU and, where possible, know the language and history.

On issues of migration policy, the EU is internally divided and cannot speak with one voice, so its activity in this area is contested. To achieve unity in migration policy, it is necessary to overcome a number of disagreements. A supranational, more liberal European Commission and an intergovernmental, more restrictive European Council should work together in a coordinated manner, while hesitancy about pooling sovereignty should be reduced.

EU member states must be willing to look beyond their views on migration to achieve cooperation through compromise. Moreover, the EU's own interests outweigh normative considerations of morality and values, as is evident in several respects. There is a gap between ethical rhetoric and restrictive practices on migration, where deals with other states are used to advance European interests. Acting as a realist force, even development instruments are being misused to suit EU strategic interests instead of fulfilling moral obligations, as foreign aid is redefined in favor of the EU and made conditional on migration cooperation.

By shifting legal responsibility for the fate of immigrants to sending countries, citing their participation in international agreements and, accordingly, legal obligations, the EU is, in fact, indirectly responsible for human rights violations and, thus, does not maintain its status as an "ethical" or "normative" force. Consequently, the EU is a dubious player and a self-serving force when it comes to migration policy.

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